The effects of personal involvement on dissonance and incentive theories of attitude change by McKellar, Roland Thomas David
THE EFFECTS OF PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT ON 
DISSONANCE AND INCENTIVE THEORIES OF 
ATTITUDE CHANGE 
A thesis presented to the Department of Psychology 
and Sociology, University of Canterbury 
In partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Arts 
by 
Roland Thomas David McKellar 
1973 
ABSTRACT 
This study examined Frey and Irle's (1972) 
hypotheses concerning attitude change in the light 
of an additional variable, specifically level of 
personal involvement. 
Frey and Irle (1972) hypothesized that 
under Choice/Public conditions, a Dissonance 
effect will occur and under No choice/Anonymous 
conditions an Incentive effect will occur. The 
current study had two hypotheses. One hypothesis 
was that the factor personal Involvement is as 
important as the three factors Frey and Irle 
considered. The second hypothesis was a 
reproduction of Frey and Irle's original ones. 
The first hypothesis was confirmed,the second 
rejected. 
It is considered that Frey and Irle 
did not provide a satisfactory resolution to the 
Incentive~Dissonance debate, as consideration of 
only three variables was overly simplistic. 
Neither theory is very satisfactory, due to too 
much latitude in the operational definition of 
terms. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1957, Leon Festinger introduced his 
Cognitive Dissonance version of Balance Theory (Festinger, 
1957). Initially, Cognitive Dissonance theory received 
much attention from researchers in the field of social 
psychology. This fact was emphasized by one of the 
theory's main critics, namely Bern, who commented that it: 
" ••• has received more widespread attention 
from personality and social psychologists 
in the past 10 years than any other 
contemporary statement about human 
behaviour". (Bern, 1967, p. 18J). 
However, if this statement was true for the 
ni=>rinrl lQt:;'7-lOfi?_ it must be noted that in-t-.i=>ri:>~t-. hB.s J.- - - - - -- - .;r ,,- l - ., - I J 
considerably waned in the last decade. 
Before undertaking discussion of Dissonance 
theory, mention should first be made of the research of 
Kelman (1953), who provided some basis for the later 
formulation of Festinger's theory. Kelman demonstrated 
that more attitude change occurred amongst seventh grade 
students who had been offered a comparatively low 
incentive to write an essay in favour of a less 
preferred comic book, than those who had been offered 
a comparatively higher incentive. 
2. 
Although Kelman's results are supportive of what 
the Dissonance approach would have predicted,the study is 
open to criticism. Self-selection may have contaminated 
the results, because considerably fewer subjects in the 
low-incentive condition complied with the discrepant 
request,than was the case in the high-incentive condition. 
Yet this criticism does not alter the fact that the 
Kelman study was, in many respects, the fore-runner or 
pioneer of the theory that was later formulated by 
Festinger. 
Dissonance theory rests on a number of 
assumptions. The central assumption is that man has 
an innate intolerance of inconsistency. If 
inconsistency does exist, man is motivated in the 
direction of trying to attain a balanced or consistent 
state. Using the terminology of the theory, if 
dissonance does exist, man is activated and directed to 
obtain consonance, and also to actively avoid situations 
and information that will maintain dissonance. 
a stalwart of Dissonance theory, suggests that: 
"learning to tolerate dissonance is 
possible" (Cohen, 1962). 
Cohen, 
Altogether, too little evidence is forthcoming in support 
of the assumption. 
Shaw and Skolnick (i973), proposed several of 
the questions in need of an answer. For example: How 
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centrally placed is consonance•-seeking in an individual's 
repertoire? How does consonance-seeking rank in the 
general social consensus of what constitutes desirable 
behaviour? Shaw and Skolnick argued that such 
traditional and desirable behaviours as power, approval, 
achievement and the like, were more strongly preferred 
than motivation towards consistency (or consonance). 
Shaw and Skolnick also asked: How aware or otherwise, 
of his consistency is a person? 
However, criticisms aside, Dissonance theory 
rests upon the assumption that man behaves in such a 
fashion that consistency is maximized and inconsistency 
is minimized, with regard to his interpersonal relations, 
cognitions, beliefs, feelings and actions. 
Another assumption that is decidely questionable, 
is that an overt act is required for dissonance to occur. 
For example, a person feels conflict (not dissonance), 
when he tries to choose between two desirable makes of 
car, but dissonance (or psychological discomfort) only 
after he has overtly made his choice, and acted upon it. 
However, Arrowood and Ross (1966) demonstrated that 
subjects who expected to expend much effort preparing 
for a test that they may not be required to sit, 
showed higher subjective expectation that they would 
have to take the test. In other words they exhibited 
more change in attitude, as a con~equence of dissonance, 
and this occurred in the absence of any overt act. 
(They did not have to sit the test). This study was 
a successful partial replication of an earlier study 
by Yaryan and Festinger (1961). 
4. 
Festinger•s theory purports to describe the 
organization and dynamics of the cognitive system, which 
progressively develops as cognitive elements are 
gradually integrated. The cognitive elements embrace 
a broad semantic spectrum. Cognitive elements are 
defined by such things as, for example, bits of knowledge 
(it is snowing), opinion or belief concerning oneself, 
others or the environment generally. 
Three types of relationships arise that bear on 
the dynamic interplay of new cognitive elements with 
established elements of the cognitive system. Firstly, 
a dissonant relationship, or psychological inconsistency 
is proposed as existing, whenever one cognitive element 
conflicts with another. In other words, employing 
Festinger•s terminology, the relationship is deemed 
dissonant if: 
"the one element does not, or would not be 
expected to follow from the other". 
(Festinger, 1957, p. 15) 
For a conscientious objector, discharging a rifle at 
enemy troops would constitute a cognitive element that 
is dissonant with his beliefs. .Secondly, a consonant 
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relationship exists if one cognitive element can be 
expected to follow from the other. For a conscientious 
objector, refusing to train for warfare would be a 
cognitive element consonant with his beliefs. Thirdly, 
the relationship between two cognitive elements may be 
that of "irrelevancy"; Zimbardo et al (1965), demonstrated 
that subjects who ate fried grasshoppers (a dissonant 
element) for a negatively-evaluated experimenter, 
exhibited more attitude change (in favour of such food) 
than subjects who complied for a favourably-evaluated 
experimenter. Whether the experimenter was negative 
(unpleasant) or positive (pleasant) involved manipulation 
of an "irrelevant" element, in terms of Dissonance theory. 
Similarly, Aronson and Golden (1962) showed that the 
"irrelevant" cognitive element of~, influenced 
acceptance of a speech favouring arithmetic amongst 
sixth grade school children. It must be stressed that 
"irrelevancy" of a cognitive element has a special 
meaning related narrowly to Festinger's theory. It does 
not mean irrelevancy as is commonly used. Instead, 
"irrelevancy" in Festinger's terms means that such an 
element does not directly relate to the decision such 
as a consonant or dissonant element does. 
Classes of Decision Making. 
Originally, Dissonance theory outlined two major 
classes of decision-making, that of Forced compliance, 
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which has received the most attention, and Free choice. 
The terms have a stricter meaning within the theory, 
than common usage of such words may suggest. 
In Forced compliance situations, the subject is 
induced to engage in some behaviour that is discrepant 
with his actual attitude. The classic study involving 
Forced compliance was that of Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), 
which is worthy of some elaboration as many studies have 
evolved from it. In their experiment, sixty under-
graduate subjects were randomly assigned to one of 
three experimental conditions, which respectively 
provided two levels of incentive ($1 or $20), and a 
control. The task required was identical for the subjects 
in both the $1 and the $20 conditions. Specifically, the 
subjcctc performed 
then paid either $1 or $20 to tell a waiting subject 
(actually a confederate), that the task was enjoyable. 
(Controls simply performed the repetitive task). The 
results showed that the subjects who were paid the lower 
incentive, evaluated the task as significantly more 
enjoyable than the subjects paid the higher incentive. 
Festinger and Carlsmith interpreted their results in 
the following manner. All subjects initially adhere 
to the cognition that the task is dull and boring. 
However, the experimental subjects have the additional 
cognition that they have told another "student" that 
the task is enjoyable. The subjects receiving the 
lesser incentive experience more consequent dissonance, 
than the subjects receiving the greater incentive, 
which in itself provides justification for their 
actions. The students receiving the lower incentive, 
reduce dissonance by changing their view of the task, 
so that it is more in accordance with their verbal 
description of it as "enjoyable". 
This study was not without criticism. As 
Carlsmith et al (1966) point out, some investigators 
claim that the $20 incentive, being inordinately large, 
would create guilt, suspicion, and the like. 
(Rosenberg (1965) propounded quite an elaborate alternative 
explanation along these lines). However, in order to 
counter such criticism, Brehm and Cohen (1962) 
~artially replic~ted the Festinger and Carlsmith _ ...... - -1--i:J vUUJ 
using smaller incentives (50¢, $2, $5 or $10). Their 
obtained results were supportive of Festinger and 
Carlsmith's investigation, and consistent with 
Dissonance theory predictions. 
In the Free choice class of decision-making, 
the subject is free to make a selection from a number of 
objects or alternative actions. The dependent 
variable is the subject's attitude rating of both the 
chosen and the rejected alternatives. Brehm and 
Cohen (1959) provided the very first Free choice experiment. 
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In their study, school children were asked to indicate 
on a scale their liking for each of 16 toys both before 
and after being permitted to choose one. Sorr.e subjects 
chose between qualitatively similar toys, while others 
chose between qualitatively dissimilar toys. Dissonance 
theory predicts that the magnitude of dissonance will be 
reflected in an increase in liking for the chosen 
alternative and a decrease in liking for the rejected 
alternative. The greatest evaluative change occurred in 
the subjects who chose between the dissimilar toys as 
Dissonance theory predicts. 
Comparatively speaking, the Free-choice 
situation yields greater dissonance than that of Forced 
compliance. Furthermore, dissonance increases as 
choices become more equally attractive. The F·orced 
compliance situation yields less dissonance, because there 
is greater initial justification. Dissonance theory 
holds that the greater the initial justification, the 
less the dissonance, and one may cite such experiments 
as Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) and Brehm and 
Cohen (1962) for support. 
Although the original major classes of decision-
making included either Forced compliance or Free choice 
situations, a third class has gradually evolved. 
Exposure-to-information studies , 
There are two major approaches within this 
third major class. Firstly, there are studies in which 
subjects are involuntarily exposed to information that 
contradicts that which he already has. For example, 
Bramel (1962) led subjects to either a favourable or an 
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unfavourable view of their own personality. Then he gave 
information implying that the subjects were experiencing 
homosexual arousal. The results showed that the higher 
the subjects self-esteem measure, the more arousal he 
attributed to (or projected upon) his partner, as a 
means of reducing dissonance. 
The second paradigm includes studies which 
examine a subject's readiness to expose himself to 
information discrepant with his cognitions. However, 
the effects are often hard to replicate according to 
Bern (1967), who refers to studies such as that of 
Aronson and Carlsmith (1962). McGuire (1966) claims 
that the original findings may be artifactual. 
Modes of Dissonance Reducation 
Some brevity is required here, as most research 
on the modes is less "cut and dried" than that dealing 
with factors affecting magnitude of dissonance reduction 
( see page 14). Thus, to separate modes of dissonance 
reduction, from magnitude of distonance, becomes a 
difficult task. 
As is true of other aspects of Dissonance 
theory, the modes initially proposed by the pioneers 
have been added to, ~nd a degree of sophistication 
of the organisation of this area has emerged, as the 
" 
work of Kumpf and Getz-Marchand (1973) illustrates. 
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The modes of dissonance reduction fall 
concisely into two categories. As a consequence of 
dissonance, the person can either find means of avoiding 
a change of decision, attitudes or behaviour, or 
alternatively change his decision in accordance with 
the discrepant message. The writer will examine these 
categories under the respective headings of non-
conformity and conformity. 
a) Non-conformity 
One means of achieving this is by adding 
consonant elements. To reduce post-decisional 
dissonance, the person thinks up supportive evidence to 
back up his choice or viewpoint. This changes the ratio 
of consonant to dissonant elements in a favourable 
direction. 
The individual may increase the cognitive overlap 
between cognitive elements by searching for or mis-
perceiving aspects of functional equivalence. Stated 
more simply, this means cognitively minimizing the 
differences (or increasing the similarity), between the 
chosen and the unchosen alternatives. 
Discrediting the communicator or derogation 
of source is another mode of dissonance reduction not 
involving decisional change. McGinnies (1973), in a 
study involving Japanese university students, 
demonstrated the disparagement of the less credible 
of two communicators, when both presented attitudes 
extremely discrepant from those held by the students. 
11. 
Selective attention or distortion of 
information are other modes of dissonance reduction. 
Berscheid and Walster (1969) found that when a subject 
mistreats someone else, he can deny responsibility for 
his action as a means of dissonance reduction. In 
addition, he could derogate the mistreated person, thus 
justifying his action as a means of dissonance 
reduction. Another possible mode was to minimize 
the person's suffering. 
If 
Kumpf and Gatz-Marchand (1973) added a welcome 
degree of sophistication to the area, in their 
organisation of modes of dissonance reduction into 
Confrontation and Avoidance mechanisms. 
These investigators invited engaged female 
students to take part in a phony "Marriage expectancy 
test", which was supposedly a predictor of marital 
harmony. After sitting this test, the subjects 
received fake results which diffe,red negatively from 
their initial expectations of marital success. 
The avoidance mechanisms, namely devaluation 
of the issues importance and also under-recall, showed 
a steep increase as expectation-result discrepancy 
increased. The confrontation mechanisms, including 
conformity with result and derogation of source, 
were less prominent and exhibited less increase as a 
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function of discrepancy. The writer will return later 
to this study, as it relates to personality factors 
that determine the magnitude of dissonance. The 
Confrontation mechanism - conformity with result -
·:.; .. 
correctly belongs to the second category of modes by 
which an individual will change his decision, or 
conform. 
b) Conformity 
If other means of dissonance reduction are 
either closed or exhausted, an individual will change 
his decision in line with the discrepant communication, 
or in other words he conforms. The person can 
experience opinion, attitude or evaluative change 
or he can exhibit behaviour change. The distinctions 
are admittedly arbitrary, and these different types of 
change are often intertwined. However, with that 
qualification, one can turn to the study of Bochner and 
Insko (1966) who addressed themselves to the issue of 
opinion change. 
(i) Under conditions of high source 
credibility, the opinion change was greatest when 
opinion-communication discrepancy was maximized, which 
is consistent with Dissonance theory predictions. 
However, under conditions involving a less credible 
source, opinion change was related to discrepancy size 
by an inverted U-shaped function. This interesting 
effect has no simple explanation in Dissonance theory 
terms. 
Evaluative change has been shown with regard 
to attraction to groups, preference for objects, 
valuation of activities, food preferences, sensory 
characteristics, subjective experiences, assessment 
of a case history, and liking for persons to mention 
a few examples (Brehm and Cohen 1962). Later in 
this account, Cohen's study involving liking for 9nes 
fiance will be examined; thus there is no point in 
elaborating at this stage. 
(ii) With respect to behaviour change as a 
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mode of dissonance reduction, Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) 
examined worker productivity. There were four 
conditions, including two specifically designed to 
arouse dissonance. In one condition, subjects were 
paid $3.50 an hour, but were led to believe that they 
were over-paid because they lacked the necessary 
qualifications. In a second condition, the subjects 
were paid a piece rate of JO¢, and again led to 
believe that they W8re overpaid for the same reason. 
The non-dissonant conditions involved the same 
payment, but the subjects were led to believe that 
they were receiving a fair pay. In line with 
Dissonance theory predictions, the subjects in the 
two dissonant conditions yielded the highest 
productivity. 
dissonance. 
This was their overt mode of reducing 
Magnitude of Dissonance 
A number.of factors affect the degree or 
magnitude of dissonance. Therefore, under what 
conditions, according to the research~s the_ ~rousa!_ 
of dissonance greatest? 
When a "voluntary commitment" is made, the 
greater the choice in the compliance, or otherwise, 
the greater the dissonance (Brehm and Cohen, 1962). 
Frey and Irle considered Choice to be a precondition 
for dissonance to even exist. 
Also, the size of the discrepancy between the 
subject's view and the discrepant communication, can 
affect the magnitude of dissonance. However, another 
determinant of the magnitude of dissonance, namely 
effort, determines whether dissonance is increased or 
decreased. The Effort hypothesis has been stated 
as follows: 
"Under greater, but not lesser degrees 
of perceived effort expended, increasing 
the discrepancy between a person's 
initial position and new information 
counter to that opinion gives rise to 
increased dissonance and consequent 
attitude change." (Cohen, in Brehm and 
Cohen, p. 388, 1962). 
The converse is also trueo 
Himmelfarb and Arazi (1974), examined the 
effects of choice, source attractiveness and size of 
discrepancy with respect to an issue that the 
subjects were highly involved in. The obtained 
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results were consistent with Dissonance theory 
predictions. When sub~ects chose to expose themselves 
to the discrepant message, that from an unattractive 
source produced the greatest opinion change. (The 
theory holds that a message from an unattractive 
source yields the most dissonance, and therefore 
attitude change, but this will be taken up at a later 
stage). 
Himmelfarb and Arazi's study highlighted the 
important role choice plays in the magnitude of 
dissonance. These investigators demonstrated that 
under no choice conditions, more opinion change 
occurred in the subjects who rece.i ved the discrepant 
message from the attractive source. 
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Linder and Worchel (1970) examined the issues 
of both effort and involvement. They attempted to test 
the hypothesis that the greater the effort 3ubjects 
exerted to attain the conclusion to a syllogistic 
argument, the more they would finally agree with that 
conclusion; the "conclusion" was that cigarette 
smoking causes lung cancer. 
There were three experimentally manipulated 
levels of effort and two levels of commitment (or 
involvement), the latter defined by subjects who 
smoked and subjects who did not. 
For subjects who had highest involvement in 
the issue (smokers), the amount of effort expended was 
directly related to attitude change, as predicted1:y 
Dissonance theory. The less involved subjects 
(non-smokers) did not show this effect. One criticism 
of Linder and Worchel's delineation of involvement, is 
that many non-smokers could conceivably also score 
highly on any involvement measure. 
Post-choice dissonance increases as the 
attractiveness of the rejected alternative increases. 
This was first demonstrated by Brehm in a 11free choice" 
experiment (Brehm, 1956). Students were requested to 
predecisionally rate eight consumer products for 
"desirability", then to choose between pairs of these 
products, and finally to rate them all again. It was 
contrived that one item in each pair would always be 
subjectively "highly desirable", while the 
complementary ite~ varied in attractiveness, although 
r" 
the latter was always rated less "desirable". 
The results showed that dissonance could be 
increased by increases in the subjective desirability 
of the rejected (unchosen) item. 
If the "attractiveness" of the rejected 
alternative increased dissonance, the converse was 
also true, as would perhaps be expected. That is, 
the greater the negative aspects of the chosen 
alternative, the greater the dissonance. 
A degree of "real-life" flavour is involved 
in a study by Cohen involving betrothal, an issue of 
some involvement for the subjects (Brehm and Cohen 
1962, p. 78-81). 
Yale College students answered "subjective" 
and "objective" questions on a 71 point response 
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scale, which varied from "not at all" to "extremely". 
The objective questions involved frequency of other 
dating, loss of freedom, financial differences, social 
level differences and difficulty in reaching a decision 
to marry. The"subjective 11questions included: 
1) How much does your future seem empty 
without your fiancee? 
18. 
2) In general, being as frank as possible, 
how much would you say you love your girl? 
J) How much do you feel that you were "meant 
for each other"? 
Only the "subjective" feelings, not being clearly 
"reality-based" were expected to change in order to 
reduce dissonance. 
It was expected that the less positive the 
objective aspect prior to the overt decision (the 
actual engagement), the greater the post-decisional 
dissonance, that is, greater discrepancy (see page 14) 
At the end of the subjects' vacation, the scale was 
again administered, as the expectations were fulfilled. 
This writer considers that Cohen made 
unwarranted assumptions in the compiling of the 
various objective questions. For example, the issue 
of financial discrepancy between the respective 
families would be irrelevant, at least in the event 
of the writer contemplating engagement. The 
investigator should not assume that the objective 
questions are salient for each subject without 
providing an experimental check in support. 
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The greater the number of rejected 
alternatives, the greater the degree of dissonance. 
This is because the more alternatives from which one 
has to choose from, the more one must give up, and 
consequently, the greater the magnitude of dissonance. 
The Brehm and Cohen (1959a) study, which illustrates 
this point, was discussed earlier in this account 
When children chose between qualitatively similar and 
qualitatively dissimilar toys, ratings on chosen 
toys were displaced in a more favourable direction. 
However, the displacement effect was larger when the 
choice was made from a larger number of alternativeso 
This experiment also exemplifies the effect 
on the magnitude of dissonance of "cognitive overlap". 
3pecifically, the grea te1~ t.he siuilla:c:L t,y or 
"cognitive overlap" between two alternatives, the less 
the degree of dissonance aroused. Conversely, 
dissonance is greater when a choice is made between 
dissimilar alternatives because: 
"what one has to give up relative to what 
one gains, increases". (Festinger, 1964, 
p. 373). 
In accordance with this, Brehm and Cohen 
found that the displacement effect of ratings on 
chosen toys was larger when the choice was made from 
dissimilar, rather than similar alternatives (toys). 
Although there is a lack of further evidence 
on the question, an early study by Ehrlich, Guttman, 
Schonback and Mills (1957) suggested that the more 
. -
20. 
recent the decision, the more the dissonance aroused. 
Ehrlich et al found that owners of brand new cars read 
advertisements concerning their car, rather than 
advertisements concerning cars that they had considered, 
but finally rejected. However, this effect was 
strongest for owners who had only recently bought a car. 
The tendency was much less pronounced for owners who 
had purchased their car a relatively long time ago. 
The recency idea has intuitiv~ appeal, but 
awaits further experimental support. 
In a comparison of the Free choice and 
Forced compliance. classes of decision making (page 5), 
the writer mentioned that the former situation yielded 
the greater dissonance. In fact, the bulk of evidence 
supports the idea that choice is perhaps a pre-condition 
for dissonance to even exist. The choice idea is later 
elaborated, as it relates to the current study 
The Aronson and Carlsmith (1962) study indicated the 
importance of choice, by suggesting that the less the 
coercion to induce discrepant commitment, the greater 
the dissonance aroused. In this study, a table of 
preferential rankings for five toys was constructed for 
nursery-school children. Half of the children were 
"mildly threatened" and the remaining half were 
"severely threatened" with regard to playing with a 
highly regarded toy, (which was ranked second on the 
table). After being allowed to play with the 
remaining four toys, the five toys were again ranked. 
21. 
The results showed that the forbidden toy had 
decreased in attractiveness as a mode of dissonance 
reduction more in the "mild threat" condition, than in 
the "severe threat" condition. 
This particular investigation raises ethical 
considerations. The "severe threat" condition 
involved an expression of anger, annoyance and 
rejection of the children at what is an impressionable 
age. One could perhaps question the ethics involved 
here. 
Several studies have suggested that the 
greater the frequency of engaging in negative 
(discrepant) behaviour, the greater the degree of 
dissonance aroused. 
In an investigation by Raven and Fishbein (1961), 
subjects were given either electric shock or no shock 
for denying the reception of Extra Sensory Perception 
(ESP) images. 
It was expected that subjects who consistently 
denied receiving ESP messages would reduce the dissonance 
between their realisation that they had 
reported in the negative and the, 
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knowledge that they had accepted punishment (shock), by 
reducing their belief in ESP. The results confirmed 
this expectation based on Dissonance theory. 
The effects of engaging in counterattitudinal 
behaviour is an issue that requires much more 
experimental investigation. However, there has been a 
limited amount of research in this area. It seems 
that the more information regarding the negative 
consequences of his counterattitudinal stand, the 
greater the degree of dissonance that occurs. A recent 
study that provided qualified support for this aspect, 
is a study by Cooper, Zanna and Goethals (1974). 
Although aversive behavioural consequences (like 
discovering that an esteemed other person has changed 
his view as a result of the subject's counterattitudinal 
essay), can affect the magnitude of dissonance reduction, 
this depended on the result that lying about an 
experimental task, only produced attitude change when 
the subject "misled" a confederate who was liked. 
Alternatively, when the confederate was not "misled" 
or when he was disliked (or both), no attitude change 
occurred. 
The degree of justification involved in the 
commitment to discrepant behaviour obviously has an 
important part to play in determining the magnitude of 
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dissonance. Originally, Brehm and Cohen (1962) 
claimed that the less the justification - financial or 
otherwise - the greater the resultant dissonance upon 
commitment to a discrepant act. However, recent 
evidence has demonstrated that Brehm and Cohen's 
contention cannot be accepted, without much qualification. 
This fact has been illustrated by studies utilising 
financial incentives, which will presently be discussed. 
However, first to be examined is source attractiveness, 
which shows that even elements deemed "irrelevant" by 
Dissonance theory have some bearing on attitude changes. 
Specifically, the more negative the characteristics 
of the communicator, the greater the dissonance 
experienced if the individual commits himself to 
discrepant behaviour. 
The credibility of a communicator can be 
divided into two categories of traits. Firstly, a set 
of traits can be "relevant" to the specific communication 
involved; amount of expertise is one example. On the 
other hand, a set of traits can be "irrelevant" to the 
communication; the communicator's sex, whether he is 
pleasant or otherwise, are pertinent examples. Zimbardo, 
Weisenberg, Firestone and Levy (1965), manipulated 
"irrelevant" positive traits in their study. 
There is less justification in engaging in 
counterattitudinal behaviour as a result of inducement by a 
communicator with "irrelevant" negative traits. 
Therefore, more dissonance and concomitant attitude 
change, results from such behaviour. 
In Zimbardo et al's investigation, attitudes 
towards eating a disliked food, namely grasshoppers, 
were measured both before and after persuasive attempts 
to get subjects to eat the food by a communicator who 
assumed a positive role for half of the subjects and a 
negative role for the rest. 
Unfortunately, these investigators possibly 
created an ambiguous figure instead of _the negative 
role that was intended. The supposedly negative 
communicator was basically friendly, except for one 
instant when he loses his temper with an assistant. 
The subjects who did perform the discrepant act, 
increased their liking for grasshoppers more following 
inducement by the negative communicator, than for the 
positive communicator. Control subjects demonstrated 
no such change in attitudes. Thus the results were in 
accordance with Dissonance theory predictions. 
In a more recent study, Himmelfarb and Arazi (197L~) 
found that the greatest attitude change occurred in 
subjects who exposed themselves to a discrepant message 
from an unattractive source. 
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Role of Personality Variables 
It is clear that personality variables have an 
effect on the magnitude of dissonance. Self-esteem was 
one aspect of personality that received early attention 
in dissonance experiments. In a study by Bramel (1962), 
subjects were initially given information designed to 
increase or decrease their self-evaluation, and then were 
led to believe that they were making homosexual advances. 
Subjects with raised self-evaluations reduced 
dissonance by projecting homosexual tendencies onto 
others. 
fl 
Kumpf and Getz-Marchand (1973) obtained some 
interesting results with respect to personality, using 
" "·· / 
engaged female students who sat?Tairn 11.Marriage 
expectancy test". Avoidance mechanisms (derogation of 
source and under-recall) increased as a function of 
degree of discrepancy (expectancy-subject's expectation), 
when three levels of discrepancy were used. 
There was also a significant interaction 
between discrepancy and self-esteem. Subjects with 
high self-esteem (Feelings of Inadequacy Scale: Janis 
and Field (1959)), used derogation of communicator most 
at the highest discrepancy level, while subjects with 
low self-esteem derogated most in the medium discrepancy 
condition. 
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In addition, subjects with higher self-esteem 
do not conform (that is, accept a discrepant 
communication) as much as those with lower self-esteem. 
Persons with low self-esteem tend to devalue the 
importance of being happily married more than those with 
high self-esteem. Conformity with result and 
devaluation of the issues importance are both 
confrontation mechanisms. 
Dissonance theory and its Opponents 
With respect to the justification involved in 
counter-attitudinal behaviour, much research has 
examined the role of financial incentives. Dissonance 
theorists claimed that the greater the financial 
incentive (or justification), the less the dissonance 
experienced upon the performance of some counter-
attitudinal behaviour. The converse is also true. The 
classic investigation, which has been already discussed, 
was that of Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). To 
reiterate, these investigators found more dissonance 
and concomitant attitude change in subjects paid only 
$1 as financial incentive, than subjects who received 
$20 financial incentive to perform a counterattitudinal 
act. 
As investigations on the incentive question 
burgeoned, dissonance theory faced a "two-pronged" attack. 
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On the one hand, some investigators obtained the same 
result that Dissonance theorists predicted, but offered 
a different theoretical interpretation. Kelley (1967) 
proposed an explanation in terms of Attribution theory. 
He suggested that subjects who agreed·to the counter-
attitudinal task for low incentives incorrectly assume 
that they are unique in their compliance, and infer that 
the compliant behaviour is actually consonant with their 
real attitude. 
Kelley's theory does not appear to be 
supported by concrete evidence. Cooper, Jones and 
Tuller (1972) varied both levels of incentives and 
information regarding the compliance of previous subjects, 
and still found more attitude change in subjects 
complying for lower incentives. Thus Cooper et al's 
results did not support Kel]ey's alternative theoretical 
explanation. 
Rosenberg (1965) suggested that "evaluation 
apprehension 11 accounted for greater attitude change in 
subjects complying for smaller incentives. Subjects did 
not change their attitudes in the high incentive 
conditions, because they feared a negative evaluation 
of their honesty and mental health by the 1nvestigator. 
Both Rosenberg's experimental design and his interpretation 
have been roundly condemned by many researchers. To 
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mention just one, Aronson (1966) pointed out that there 
were many differences between Rosenberg's 1965 study and 
the study he was intending to replicate (namely, Cohen in 
Brehm and Cohen, 1962). 
The other "prong" of the "two-pronged" attack 
was perhaps more "piercing". Some investigators 
discovered a different result than that predicted by 
Dissonance theorists, and in some cases an alternative 
explanation was put forward. 
The most powerful of such theories is 
Incentive theory. Stated simply, this theory holds that 
the greater the amount of financial inducement, the 
greater the actual attitude change. Elms and Janis (1965) 
performed a study that they interpreted as being 
supportive of incentive theory. Subjects were paid 
either $0.50, $1.50, $5 or $10 to write an anonymous 
essay counter to their viewpoint (advocating that 
qualified U.S.A. students should be sent to Russia for 
a period of four years). Either negative or positive 
sponsorship of such a scheme was also provided, as well 
as the presence or absence of role playing. 
The results showed that only one of the ten 
experimental groups showed significant attitude change. 
The subjects who were paid the maximwn financial 
incentive ($10), under favourable sponsorship conditions, 
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showed more attitude change than subjects paid the 
minimum financial incentive. Thus, attitude change 
oc~urred in such.a fashion that Incentive theory, and 
not Dissonance the.cry, was supported. A number of 
studies obtained results supportive of Incentive 
theory. Yet other studies were obtaining results that 
supported the dissonance effect - an inverse relationship 
between amount of financial incentive and attitude change. 
Carlsmith, Collins and Helmreich (1966) shed 
some light on the.debate when they managed to produce 
a dissonance and an incentive effect, but under 
different optimum conditions. Carlsmith et al 
discovered that subjects who engaged in a ''face-to-face" 
~onfronta~ion (role play) condition, showed a negative 
relationship between money offered($0.50, $1.50 and $5) 
and attitude change~ Conyersely, subjects who had 
written a counterattitudinal essay showed a positive 
relationship between attitude change and amount of 
financial incentive offered. 
Frey and Irle (1972) noticed similarities in 
the conditions that yielded an incentive effect and the 
conditions that yielded a dissonance effect. 




Dissonant effect (that is, negative 
relationship between amount of 




Incentive effect (that is, 
positive relationship between 
amount of incentive and 
attitude change). 
If a person was allowed a high degree of 
"choice" as to whether to perform a counterattitudinal 
behaviour or not, and if he performed such an act in 
"public", a dissonance effect would result. 
On the other hand, if he has "no choice 11 as to 
whether to perform counterattitudinally and if he 
performed such an act "anonymously", an incentive effect 
would result. 
To return to the Carlsmith et al study, 
"face to face" role playing was the relatively public 
condition, while the essay writing condition was 
relatively anonymous. This experiment provided one of 
the necessary pre-conditions for the dissonance and 
incentive effect to occur, according to Frey and Irle. 
Linder, Cooper and Jones (1967) examined the other 
component, namely "choice". Linder et al found an 
incentive effect under "no choice" conditions and a 
dissonance effect under "choice" conditions. 
Both of these studies provided results that were 
consistent with Frey and Irle's hypothesis. What was 
required was an investigation that would vary "incentive" 
under both "choice/public"and "no. choiceL_anon~ous" 
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conditions. Frey and Irle obtained results that were 
supportive of their hypothesis, and also statistically 
significant. They also obtained non-significant 
incentive effects with no-choice/public, no-choice/ 
anonymous, and control conditions. 
CHAPTER II 
RATIONALE AND AIMS OF THE CURREN'r STUDY 
-(J:n-cTuding Experimental Hypotheses) 
In the formulation of their hypotheses 
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Frey and Irle (1972) considered only three variables which, 
to reiterate, included Choice, degree of Public exposure 
and Financial Incentive. In reaching their compromise to 
the Dissonance-Incentive theoretical controversy, it 
appears that Frey and Irle have been too arbitrary and 
overly simplistic in their choice of variables. 
The writer was interested in the effects 
of introducing an additional variable, while retaining 
thP ~omhinations of Frey and Irle's t,.r_,,, ,., nv u...Lu 
consideration of such an additional variable, such as 
each subject's personal Involvement in the issues 
featured in the counterattitudinal task, yield results 
other than those Frey and Irle would predict? 
The effect of the additional Involvement 
was examined by examination of the following experimental 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis.1: The effect on the dependent variable 
attitude change of the variable Involvement will be at 
least equal to that of Choice, Relative Publicity1 and 
Financial Incentive. 
This term corresponds identically to the variable Frey and 
Irle describe as Public/Anonymous. 
The final three hypotheses are simply those 
of Frey and Irle reproduced verbatim. 
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Hypothesis 2 (i) In the choice/public condition there 
is a dissonance effect. 
(ii) In the no choice/anonymous condition 
there is an incentive effect. 
(iii) In the choice/anonymous and the no choice/ 
public condition, no clear dissonance 
or incentive effects are expected. 2 
(Frey and Irle, 1972, p. 47). 
2This has still been reproduced verbatim, despite it being 
technically incorrect in that a null hypothesis has been 




A total of 100 subjects were recruited from 
several classes of trainee nurses attached either to 
the Christchurch Public Hospital or the Christchurch 
Technical Institute. Although only 78 subjects were 
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required the additional 22 subjects represent the 
inevitable minority of subjects who refuse to comply 
with the counterattitudinal task, or whose results had 
to be eliminated from analysis. Thus, for each of 
the 12 experimental groups, as well as the sole 
control group, a minimum of six subjects were randomly 
allocqted; for the above-mentioned reason, some groups 
initially had 1-2 more subjects than the required 
minimum. 
The choice of trainee nurses was made for two 
major reasons, the first being the approximate 
homogeneity of such a population, with r~spect to sex, 
educational level, economic position and age. 
Sex differences in dissonance research have 
been largely overlooked. Yet sex differences definitely 
can affect the results of dissonance experiments in the 
ti 
view of Kumpf and Gotz-Marchand (1973). McGuire (1968.) 
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maintained that "influenceability" was greater for males 
than for females. 
There was some homogeneity with regard to 
education, as a certain minimum level is required for 
acceptance as a trainee nurse. 
Reasonable homogeneity of financial standing 
was attained, as no subject was in a high income-earning 
bracket, although there was some degree of variation 
between subjects nevertheless. However, it is 
important that some attempt be made to ensure that some 
homogeneity pertains to financial standing in dissonance 
research. Obviously, a millionaire and a pauper will place 
a different real value assessment of the worth of a $3.00 
incentive. 
All subjects recruited (with one exception1 ) 
could be described as "young", their ages falling 
approximately within the 17-26 age group. 
The second major reason for use of this 
particular population is that it is non-university 
student in nature. Too much research is based on the 
university student population, -despite its- differences with 
the general public to whom such results are readily 
extrapolated. For dissonance research another problem 
1This subject was atypical in that she was middleaged; 
her result was eliminated from analysis for this 
reason after consideration. 
arises from this. Much of dissonance research is 
confounded by the fact that the real reason for 
compliance is not amount of incentive, but desire 
to appease the studen~s examiner, to avoid giving a 
negative impression and to meet partial course 
requirements. 
36. 
This study was free of such confounding, 
because the experimenter was in no way associated with 
scholastic assessment of the trainee nurses who served 
as subjects. 
Many investigators have provided financial 
incentive to potential subjects at the recruitment 
stage, which would seem to be an uncontrolled 
variable. That is, some subjects may end up writing 
a counterattitudinal essay because of such an 
uncontrolled variable. Carlsmith et al (1966), for 
example, paid a recruitment fee of $2.50. This figure 
is in excess of the two lower levels of financial 
incentive ($0.50 and $1.50) that they provided. 
Therefore, the recruitment fee may have the undesirable 
effect of decreasing the relative difference between 
the different incentive levels. 
In accordance with this criticism, the 
experimenter did not offer prospective subjects any 
recruitment fee, but instead made a standardized mention 
of financial remuneration during Phase I of the experiment. 
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b) Overview of Procedure 
A booklet consisting of an Involvement and an 
Attitude questionnaire was constructed2 • On the first 
questionnaire, a person could indicate his degree of 
personal involvement (by use of a 13 point scale), for 
each of thirty statements involving different issues. 
The second questionnaire allowed a person to express 
the extent of agreement or disagreement with each of 
the same statements, by use of a seven point Likert-
type scale. 
During experimental Phase I of the study, this 
questionnaire booklet was administered to successive 
classes of trainee nurses, at either Christchurch Public 
Hospital or the Christchurch Technical Institute 
(School of Nursing). 
After appropriate introduction of himself, the 
experimenter (E) handed out the booklets, and explained 
the simple procedure for their completion. After 
ensuring that there were no queries, E requested that 
the trainee nurses commence writing. 
After ten minutes of writing, E requested the 
class's attention. He explained the detachable 
Recruitment (Appointment) cards, and briefly, carefully 
2see Appendices A and B. 
avoiding any detail, mentioned ,Phase II and II of the 
study. However, E did point out that he was unable 
to say very much about the study as their knowledge 
could adversely influence the results, but that he 
would explain everything when it was finished. 
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An accurate indication of time commitment was 
gi"!en, for those trainee nurses intending to compl°ete 
all phases. 
No idea of the financial manipulations was 
imparted, although the class was told that some money 
from "research funds 11 was available. 
E explained the exact location of the 
experimental setting for the final two phases of the 
otudy. Ire vvTote the Week from which t1°ain88 r1u:r:·:::;1j8 
could choose a time. They were asked to write the 
selected time on one Recruitment card, and take the 
second card with them when they had finished the 
questionnaire booklet. (The second card had details 
of the location of the experimental setting, as well 
as E's telephone number). The trainee nurses were re-
quested to inform E if they found themselves unable 
to keep their appointment. 
The class was then asked to finish their 
booklets, and leave quietly when they had done so. 
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For each subject, there was an average of five 
days delay until experimental Phase II. During this 
time, E prepared for Phase II. Examination of the 
completed questionnaire booklets revealed the necessity 
of contacting some subjects, who had chosen the same 
time as others, so that a new time could be scheduled. 
Other subjects were contacted because their intentions 
as regards their appointment time was unclear. 
For each subject's completed booklet, E was 
able to choose an issue statement of Low, Medium and 
High personal Involvement, by examining the Involvement 
questionnaire. By a random selection technique, a 
statement representing the highest scaled value, the 
lowest scale value, and the most intermediate scale 
involving issues, respectively. 
However, to be chosen such statements had to 
be scored consistently on both questionnaires and not 
scored as Undecided on the Attitude questionnaire. 
Assignment sheets were then prepared for each 
subject, by phrasing each of the three chosen statements 
such that counterattitudinal headings resulted. 
The experimental setting for Phase II (and II) 
of the study consisted of an "office-type" room 
(Experimental Room 1), and an adjoining larger lecture 
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hall (Experimental Room 2). The room and materials 
were organised to allow an acceptably high level of 
standardization of procedure. In addition, E maintained 
a consistent manner and mode of dress for all subjects. 
Each subject was randomly allocated to each of 
the 12 Experimental and one Control groups, in such a 
way that the first complying thirteen of these became 
the first member of such groups. As she arrived, each 
subject was shown to the appropriate seat in 
Experimental Room 1. 
For all subjects, E repeated his comments 
concerning his authority to conduct his study, to 
provide reassurance. Additionally, reassurance 
concerning eventual debriefing was also given. 
Choice/Public (or Anonymous) Grou s (All levels of 
inancia Incentive · , 
With reference to Fig. 3 (p. 60), this pattern 
of condition refers to groups A to F (inclusive). 
Early on in the initial interview, the subject's 
free choice as to whether she complied with E's request 
or refused was emphasised. 
Ethen produced the three headed sheets, each 
with a counterattitudinal heading, representing that 
particular subject's issues of Low, Medium and High 
personal involvement. E explained the experimental 
task, which was to write convincing and persuasive 
points in support of the counterattitudinal heading, 
for five minutes per sheet. 
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Ethen informed the subject of the financial 
Incentive, which was $5.00, $J.OO or $1.00, depending 
on the experimental group to which the particular 
subject had been allocated. 
The Choice/Public subjects were informed their 
assignments would need to be signed and that, during 
experimental Phase III, they would be asked to defend 
these "to an Assistant of mine". The Choice/Anonymous 
were merely told that their assignments would not have 
to be signed, and their effort would be relatively 
anonymous. 
After another reminder of their Choice, E 
timed their decision to either comply or refuse. 
Subjects who complied were handed their 
first sheet, a pen and the appropriate financial 
incentive and shown to the adjoining experimental room 2. 
The stop-watch was set, and the subject reminded of 
the time limit. The subject was left alone in Room 2, 
except for E returning to collect and deliver sheets. 
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Non-complying subjects were thanked for their 
cooperation to date, and asked "for experimental 
reasons 0 why they could not comply. The terminal 
procedure used with the complying subjects was then 
employed. 
When the subjects had completed their third 
assignment, they were handed a questionnaire booklet 
(untimed) which was identical to that used for Phase I, 
except that the order of the statements had been 
randomized. This provided a measure of any 
Initial attitude change. 
When the questionnaire booklet was finished, 
the Phase III appointment was made seven days (+1) into 
the future. "Limited period" secrecy was requested, 
until E attended them, during which he would debrief 
in full. 
No Choice/Public (or Anonym$Js) ~rfi)s (All levels 
of financial Incentive $ 5, , an , 
With reference to Fig. 3 (p. 60), this pattern 
of conditions refers to groups G to L (inclusive). 
This procedure was identical to that used by 
the other six groups; except that Choice was not 
emphasised. In displaying the assignment sheets, E 
was informing the subject of what she "was required''to do. 
At the end of his description of the task and other 
concomitants E was slightly "pushy" in telling her 
"you had best get started". 
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All other details were identical to the Choice 
groups. 
Control Group (M) 
These subjects were initially greeted and 
reassured as to E's authority, as were the 
Experimental subjects. They were then given the 
questionnaire booklet (second edition) to complete. 
When they had completed this (in Room i), E arranged 
an appointment for Phase III in identical manner as 
employed with the Experimental subjects. 
In experimental Phase III, all subjects were 
greeted, and then shown into Room 2, with instructions 
to do the questionnaire booklet again. Once again, 
the booklet was identical in content with only the 
order of the statements randomized. This 
administration of the booklet, provided a measure of 
the temporal stability of any attitude change over a 
period of approximately seven days. It also would 
possibly highlight any differences or similarities 
between the Experimental and the Control subjects. 
It also allowed an examination of Involvement of the 
three issues across time and across groups. 
When she had completed the booklet, each 
subject was shown into experimental Room 2, for the 
final interview. Firstly, each subject was requested 
to rate, on a thirteen point scale (seep. 77), how 
much choice they felt E gave them, in their decision 
to comply or refuse. Secondly, on another thirteen 
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point scale, subjects were asked to rate how persuasive 
they had made their essays, after having re-read them. 
Both ratings were read back to the subject to ensure 
no mistakes had occurred. 
For most subjects, the remainder of the 
interview was tape-recorded, after they were cautioned 
about the need for frank answers to the questions to 
be put. In the following order, E asked the 
the "limited period" of secrecy, was checked, in a 
manner likely to encourage honesty and calmness. 
Suspected breaches were thoroughly probed, and such 
subjects requested to furnish the names of respondents, 
. thus providing a counter-check. Ethen checked the 
validity of the task, thus ensuring that each 
experimental subject really had written three 
counterattitudinal a~signments. He also asked them 
to give a reason for their counterattitudinal 
compliance with E's request. E checked to ensure no 
subject had managed to work out the purpose of the 
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study, carefully probing any possible partial 
insights. The credibility of E was checked, to ensure 
each Public subject believed she would be required to 
publicly defend her counterattitudinal assignments, 
and that each Anonymous subject believed the 
anonymity of her completed assignments would be 
respected. 
Ethen asked a series of questions designed 
to gauge general and specific reactions of each 
subject to the study. Their willingness to participate 
in a similar study, if asked, was inquired of. They 
were asked to assess what their 11best friend" would 
think of their writing assignments counter to their 
true personal views. Each subject was asked to 
"r,mmpn-t-. r,n the !:lmri11n+. 0f effort expended 0n each 
assignment and to rank each one relative to the others. 
They were asked how pleasant they found the task, and 
their mood during it. They were asked how they 
would feel about being asked to defend their 
assignments in a couple of months time, and whether 
or not (if asked), they would agree to such a request. 
Finally, they were asked for any additional comments 
concerning the study. 
Phase III concluded with E stressing the need 
for continued secrecy, until he arrived at their class 
to debrief the subjects. Each subject was thanked 
for her participation and shown out. 
c) Procedure 
1) Preliminary 
(i) Construction of booklet containing the 
Attitude and the Personal Involvement 
Questionnaires (see Appendices A and B) 
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Initially, three acquaintances generated a 
list of issues likely to be of high personal importance 
and of low personal importance to them. From the raw 
material of these three lists, the writer created 
JO statements, 15 of which were favourably phrased 
and the remainder unfavourably phrased. As an 
approximate guide, the Experimenter attempted to select 
10 issues that were highly important to him, 10 that 
were moderately important, and 10 that were of minimal 
Care 1.>!2.S i-.!:!lo=•n +.n pnc:11Y'A +.h!:lt-. 
the JO statements involving the JO issues were not 
ambiguous, were easily understood, and were not "double-
barrelled". The final JO issue statements we~e 
randomised to form the items of the Involvement 
questionnaire, and again randomised to form the 
Attitude questionnaire. 
As a safeguard against order effects, this 
pool of 30 items was completely randomized to form 
a fresh booklet for each successive administration. 
That is, three booklets, each with a different ordering 
of items, were produced to correspond to each of the 
three Experimental phases. 
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Although the Experimenter verbally outlined 
the instructions concerning the.completion of the 
booklet, to ensure that no confusion could occur, 
simple written instructions accompanied each booklet. 
Within the booklet the Attitude questionnaire· 
(Appendix B) incorporated a Likert-type scale, which 
ranged from 7 (Strongly Agree) to 1 (Strongly Disagree) 
and included a mid-point allowing for undecided 
responses (4 Undecided). In the column to the 
immediate right of each statement each subject had 
space to write a number from the scale, which best 
indicated to what extent they agreed or disagreed with 
the same. 
The Involvement questionnaire (Appendix A) 
incorporated a scale which ranged from 13 (Extremely 
Important to Me) to 1 (Not Important to Me at All). 
To the right of the statements was a column labelled 
'Degree of Importance to Me', where the subjects could 
write one of the scale numbers which best 
corresponded to the personal importance each statement 
held for them. 
The second column was labelled 'Agree ( ✓) or 
Disagree (x)' and allowed subjects to specify whether 
they agreed or disagreed with each item. This column 
provided an experimental check· on the consistency of the 
subject's agreement or disagreement as indicated on 
the Attitude questionnaire. 
(ii) Recruitment Cards 
The first Experimental phase, during which the 
100 volunteers were to be recruited, was subject to a 
specified time limitation and a large volume of 
trainee nurses to deal with. Thus, the recruitment 
and allocation of appointment times had to be 
efficient to avoid chaos. 
Two detachable cards accompanied each booklet 
to be eventually distributed during the Experimental 
phase I. Examples of such cards appear below. 
FIGURE 1 
Recruitment or Appointment Cards 
Time: 
and Date: 
Place: Room Tl5 "Clocktower" 
Arts Centre 




Phone No (or address): 
The use of the recruitment cards is explained 
in Experimental Phase I. 
2) Experimental Phase I 
The first phase of the experiment took place 
at nursing tuition classes, initially at the Christchurch 
School of Nursing, and later at the Department of 
Nursing, Christchurch Technical Institute. The first 
class was visited on 26th January, 1977 between the 
approximate times of 4.45p.m.-5.00p.m. Other classes 
followed in succession, until 12th April, 1977. A 
total of three hospital and one technical classes 
were eventually visited until subject requirements 
were fulfilled. 3 
Each class anticipated the Experimenter's 
arrival and he was shown into the room by the tutor 
who then left. E introduced himself with a brief 
undetailed description of his research. E simply 
stated that he was doing a thesis concerning people's 
views on different issues and that there were three 
parts to his experiment. This yielded virtually no 
idea of the aims implicated. 
To provide any reassurance that may be needed, 
E mentioned the authority under which he had obtained 
3All three classes of School of Nurses trainees were 
seen, successively, at this time slot. The 
Christchurch Technical Institute trainees were 
administered Phase I of the experiment between 
9.00a.m.-9.JOa,m. on Friday, 18th March, 1977. 
The final seven subjects were administered Phase I 
on Wednesday, 20th April, 1977 at the Institute. 
50. 
permission to carry out his research. 4 Estated that 
he hoped as many people as possible would take part 
in the study as subjects. 
At this point, the booklets consisting of 
the two questionnaires were quickly distributed. 
When the booklet was in front of each person, E 
verbally explained the instructions of the Personal 
Importance and the Attitude questionnaires in that 
order (refer to Appendices'A and B). The subjects 
were instructed to start as soon as they had read the 
written instructions. They were also told not to 
hesitate to put up their hands if they were unclear 
on any aspect of the instructions. 
A f'ter 
subjects would only partly be finished 5, E interrupted 
and asked for their attention to explain the 
Recruitment (Appointment) cards and how they related 
to the next experimental phase (Phase II). 
E addressed the class as follows: uyou will 
have noticed that there are two detachable (Recruitment) 
cards clipped to the booklet. Each card has a code 
number which has the same corresponding number on the 
4In the case of the hospital trainees, Miss Ne1tm1an was 
mentioned. With respect to the technical trainees, both 
the Education Department and Miss Johnson were mentioned. 
5some idea of the average time to complete the booklet 
was gained from a pre-experimental pilot study. 
top left hand corner of the booklet itself. 'I'hus, 
your questionnaires will only be number-coded, so I 
can contact people if required, but these are not 
named in any way. Your name will only be on the 
card, which will be detached from the booklet. 
These are really 'appointment' cards for the next 
phase of this study. The next phase involves a 
task that requires more time, perhaps 48 minutes, but 
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is still quite simple. During the next phase, people 
will have to do three short written assignments, followed 
by two brief questionnaires. 
I am unable to tell you too much more about 
the requirements of the next phase, or the final 
phase that completes the study, as your knowledge 
could adversely affect the results. However, when 
everyone has completed the third and final phase, I 
will then be free to explain the exact nature of the 
study, and answer any questions that arise. 
Incidentally, there is some money involved 
for those who participate in the final two phases, as 
some research funds have been made available for this 
study. The next two phases of the study will be held 
at Room Tl5 in the 'Clocktower' at the Arts Centre in 
Worcester Street". (This address E wrote on the 
blackboard. As a safeguard, E also explained the 
exact location of the Arts Centre, as well as the 
experimental rooms). 
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On the blackboard, E wrote the names of 
seven consecutive days and their corresponding dates. 
The days so ciisplayed ranged from three to nine days 
from Phase I. E continued as follows: 
"I would like each volunteer to choose any 
time that suits from one of the seven days written on 
the blackboard. As you can see these range from 
Saturday 29th January, until Friday 4th February6 • 
Then write the time and date that you have chosen on 
each 'appointment' card. On one card please write 
your telephone number (preferably) or your address if 
you are not on the telephone. Please also put your 
name in the space specified on the bottom card. 
When you have finished your booklet, take the 
Lup appuin~rtent card, ..L. - , - -- ,_ - -- -vt:.Lt:: !J11U1lt: 
number, and leave the bottom card so that I know when 
to expect each of you • If some unforeseen difficulty 
. prevents you from coming at the appointed time, I 
would appreciate your contacting me in advance, so we 
can arrange an alternative time. 
You may finish off the questionnaires now. 
When the booklets and appointment cards are completed, 
you may quietly leave, taking the top card with you. 
6The ideal would be the administration of Phase II on 
exactly the same number of days hence from Phase I, 
for all subjects. The realities of the situation 
dictated otherwise, due to the variable hours worked 
by the trainee nurses. Thus, by random allocation of 
subjects to a temporal sequence of the 12 conditions 
(i.e. s1 Choice/Public - H1 , s2 Choice/Public-Med etc.) 
it was expected that the average time delay between 
Phase I and II for each group, would be approximately 
equal. 
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Do not hesitate to put up your hand if anything 
needs changing. Thank you". 
When the last trainee had finished, E 
collected up the booklets and left. There was a lot 
of preparatory work for Phase II to be completed. 
3) Preliminary to Experimental Phase II 
The returned booklets were scrutinised to 
determine how many trainees had volunteered as subjects 
for the rest of the study. A majority of the trainees 
did complete the booklet. However, in the last three 
classes visited only a minority7 of such trainees 
had filled in the Recruitment cards (described to the 
trainees as 'Appointment' cards). Thus, most trainees 
had complied with the instructions of Phase I, but then 
opted out of the latter two experimental phases. 
The Recruitment cards of the volunteer 
trainees (now referred to as 'subjects') were carefully 
examined. It was inevitable that some degree of 
"double-booking" would occur. Thus, several subjects 
had to be phoned to determine an alternative appointment 
time, which was accomplished with ease. Other subjects 
were contacted to clarify such specified times as '~ny 
time on Thursdayu and the like. A handful of 
potential subjects had filled out all details except 
7rn contrast, a majority of the fourth class (technical 
trainees) volunteered for the rest of the experiment 
(approximately 90 per cent). 
their name; none of these people turned up, which 
effectively resolved any difficulties. Each subject 
was assigned one separate place in an appointment book. 
The next task was to determine an issue of 
Low, Medium and High personal involvement for each 
individual subject. Firstly, for a particular subject, 
the numerical responses to the items of the Involvement 
questionnaire were noted. In particular, the range of 
the numbers was considered. An item with the lowest 
number was chosen as the issue of Low personal 
involvement. An item with the highest numerical 
rating was chosen as the issue of High personal 
involvement. The item with the most intermediary 
rating (between High and Low) was chosen as the 
d 
Medilliu involving issue.v 
However, before selection was effected, the 
consistency of these three items, with respect to 
Agreement or Disagreement, was checked. This could be 
readily achieved by a comparison of the rating given 
in the Attitude questionnaire, with that of the second 
column of the Involvement questionnaire ('Agree(✓) or 
Disagree (x)'). In practice, several items were 
rejected because they indicated agreement on one 
8This presented no difficulties if there was a straight-
forward range like 1-7-13. However, if the distances 
between the most extreme values and the intermediate 
rating were uneven, by convention, the higher rating 
was chosen as the Medium involving issue {i.e. 1-7-lJ). 
questionnaire and disagreement on the other. The 
reason for such incongruous responding perhaps 
results from misreading of the particular item in 
question. 9 
5 5. 
Also eliminated were items where the subject 
indicated either Agreement or Disagreement on the 
Involvement questionnaire (second column), but 
indecision (i.e. 4='undecided') in the Attitude 
questionnaire. Naturally, often there were several 
identically Low or High ratings. Strict use of a die 
determined that the chosen item was randomly selected. 
Once the three issues had been chosen, the 
assignment sheets were prepared. This simply 
involved heading each of three sheets of lined paper, 
with one of the chosen issue statements, phrased in 
such a way to represent the opposite of the particular 
subject's attitude. For example, if the subject 
indicated agreement with the item: 
"Marijuana smoking should be legalised in 
New Zealand", 
then the counterattitudinal heading became: 
"Marijuana smoking should not be legalised 
in New Zealand". 
Therefore, for each experimental subject there were three 
sheets each headed with one of three counterattitudinally 
phrased issue statements. 
9The inclusion of the second column in the Involvement 
questionnaire as an experimental check proved to be more 
than merely~edantic, as incongruous responding 
indicated. 
As noted earlier the items of the 
first booklet (Phase I), were again randomised to 
yield a second bo0klet for Phase II. Apart from the 
differences in item ordering the second booklet was 
otherwise identical to the fitst. 
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Standard sized white envelopes containing 
alternately $5, $J and $1 were prepared, which served 
as representing the three levels of financial incentive. 
Ballpoint pens, appointment cards and a 
stop-watch completed the requirements for 
experimental Phase II. 
4) Experimental Phase II 
The Experimental Setting 
Some care was taken to standardise the 
procedure as much as was possible, and this 
required attention to the organisation of the 
experimental setting. A secondary reason for a 
reasonably high degree of organisation, was the large 
number of subjects who were scheduled within certain 
restricted intervals of time (There had been an 
unavoidable tendency for subjects to cluster on 
particular days). 
When subjects arrived at the main foyer of the 
Arts Centre (in the Clocktower), they encountered a sign 
indicating the exact whereabouts of the experimental 
room (Tl5). In addition, the Secretary of the Arts 
Centre was instructed to appropriately direct any 
subjects who arrived at her office. 'I'hese two 
precautions were of course, additional to the 
instructions E had delivered during experimental 
Phase I. The door of the experimental room had a 
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further notice with relevant details. It was unlikely 
that any subject would fail to arrive at the correct 
d t . t· 10 es 1na ion • 
'IiA~ chairs were provided in the hallway for 
any subjects who had to wait a while. 
occassionally subjects arrived early.· 
Also, 
The experimental setting proper consisted 
of a medium sized "office-type" room (called 
Experimental Room 1) and an adjoining considerably 
larger lecture hall, with a tiered layout of desk rows 
(called Experimental Room 2)(see Figure 2, p. 58). 
To one side of the first room was a large 
office desk as indicated in the diagram (next page). 
E's chair was placed on one side, while the subjects 
chair was placed on the other. Most materials were kept 
in desk drawers, so that they could be readily 
presented at the appropriate times. Initially, when 
each subject was first seated, the desk was bare, with 
the exception of E's written procedural instructions 
10one subject still managed to lose her way, having left her 
Recruitment ('appointment') card behind. She tried to 
reach the destination by trial-and-error, and finally 
arrived very late. 
Subjects (S) 
FIGURE 2 





ROOM 1 . 
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which concealed the appointment book. 
As much as was possible, E maintained a 
consistent, neat mode of attire. (This was maintained 
for all three phases of the experiment).· The 
important role of what Festinger called "Irrelevant" 
cognitive elements in attitude change has been 
stressed by other researchers, notably Zimbardo 
· et al (1965) and Aronson and Golden (1962). In the 
context of this study, if E had been dressed markedly 
differently while experimenting with different subjects 
such a cognitively "Irrelevant" element could have 
differentially affected attitude change, according to 
Dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, p. 11). 
An equally significant cognitively 
"Irrelevant" element is the effect of E's manner 
on the subjects. A neutral manner would probably 
be perceived as indifference, and would thus have a 
negative effect. In addition, it would have been 
a difficult facade for E to consistently uphold. 
Therefore E attempted to maintain a slightly friendly, 
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This refers to groups A to F, as indicated 
in Figure 3. 
To eliminate any sequence effects, each 
subject was allocated.to a different group, as she 
arrived which was mentioned earlier. 
When eac~ subject arrived, she was seated at 
the desk as indicated in Fig. 2. 
began as follows: 
Once seated, E 
"Firstly, thank you for coming. This experiment 
being conducted is part of a thesis, which requires me 
to see quite a few people. I originally approached 
Miss Newman11 and she gave me permission to do this 
experiment. I am explaining this because people may 
( 
wonder by whose authority I am interviewing nurseso 
You may wonder what this experiment is all 
about and where it is leading. I want to reassure 
you that I will explain in full the nature of the 
experiment and answer any questions at the completion 
of all experimenting. If I explained anything now, it 
would adversely affect the results of this study. 
11Thus, this reassurance was repeatedas a precaution in 
case any subjects did not hear, or alternatively as a 
reminder. Of course, when interviewing the technical 
trainees, the Education Department and Miss Johnson 
were cited - not Miss Newman. The effort to reassure 
was quite important for some subjects. For example, 
one subject was concerned about my possibly using 
the questionna:i.re information to discredit her. 
Before I tell you what I would like you to 
do, I wish to stress that the decision to comply or 
refuse is completely up to you. You do not have to 
do the task, although it will not take you long". 
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At this point E produced the three assignments 
and displayed them in front of S so that she could read 
all three counterattitudinal headings at a glance. 
After allowing a pause for S to read the headings, E 
continued: 
"I would like you to write as many points as 
you can in support of each of three statements, which 
you see here at the top of these three pages. You 
will have exactly five minutes to write on each one. 
You need to make your points as convincing and 
persuasive as you are able. At the end of the first· 
five minutes I will take your first sheet and give 
you the second headed sheet. When you have finished 
the second sheet, I will give you the third headed 
sheet so you can write your third assignment. 
I realise that you may not agree with the 
statements, so if you are prepared to write the 
assignments you will be paid$ (5, 2 or 1) 
immediately out of available research funds provided 
for the purpose". 
When addressing the Choice/Public subjects 
(groups A, Band C) E said: 
"Your completed sheets vdll need to be 
signed, so that your effort will not be anonymous. 
I am asking each person if they would mind coming 
just once more. If you agree to the task you will 
be asked to briefly defend what you have written to 
an assistant of mine. (Other nurses will be doing 
something else for the same period of time). 
This is what is required of you. Remember 
the choice is yours. Do you want to write the 
assignments?" 
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When addressing the Choice/Anon~nous subjects 
(groups D, E and F) E said (instead): 
0 Your completed sheets do not have to be 
signed so that your effort will be anonymous. No-one 
else will see the completed sheets. This is what is 
required of you. Remember the choice is yours. Do you. 
want to write the assignments?" 
For both the Choice/Anonymous and the 
Choice/Public groups, the above question was followed 
by the stop-watch timing of the subjects decision 
either to comply with.or refuse the task of writing 
the three counterattitudinal assignments. 
In terms of Festinger's theory the 
predecisional latency was a measure of conflict 
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as opposed to the post-decisional dissonance experienced 
by subjects who complied. Once the Shad reached a 
decision,E immediately handed her the appropriate 
amount of money, which was $5.00 for the High 
incentive subjects, $3.00 for the Medium incentive 
subjects, and $1.00 for the Low incentive subjects. 
Of course, this money was enclosed within the standard 
white envelopes mentioned earlier. 
In addition to the financial incentive S 
was handed the first counterattitudinal assignment 
sheet and a pen, and personally shown to a seat in the 
adjoining room. As soon as S was seated with the 
first iheet in front of her, ~ reminded her of the 
time limit by stating: 
"You have exactly five minutes from now", 
and simultaneously set the stop-watch in full view. 
Ethen left Sand returned to Experimental 
Room 1, allowing completion of the first assignment 
without the extra apprehension that may have resulted 
from his presence. 
Non-complying subjects were thanked for their 
cooperation until this point of the study, and were 
asked to give the reason for their decision as it was 
needed "for experimental reasons". Ethen dismissed 
these subjec~s, with the same comments concerning his 
intention to attend a class in the near future to 
debr:ief. all participants, but cautioned them 
concerning the need for secrecy until then. 
When 4 minutes 50 seconds had elapsed, E 
returned to the lecture room preparatory to receiving 
the first assignment. Thus, for all subjects, the 
cue of E opening the door and appearing occur 
identically. E approached Sand said: 
"You may finish the point you are writing on". 
The Choice/Anonymous subjects were then handed the 
second assignment with the repeated comment: 
"You have exactly five minutes from now". 
The stop-watch was again simultaneously set for the 
next five minute period. 
The procedure was identical for the 
Choice/Public subjects with the exception that E 
checked to ensure that Shad signed the completed 
assignment. The occassional subject who had omitted 
this requirement was reminded with the comment: 
"Would you like to sign it please". 
Even here, the request was phrased in such a manner as 
to be consistent with a choice situation. 
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As each assignment was collected, it was 
simply placed on a window ledge immediately adjacent 
to S. E returned to Experimental Room 1 without 
the assignment(s). This procedure was designed to 
reduce immediate apprehension as to what E might be 
thinking about their counterattitudinal points which 
may have detracted from their immediate task at hand 
(the writing of their successive assignment). 
Upon the completion of the third assignment, 
S was handed the (newly randomized) booklet containing 
the same Attitude and Involvement questionnaires 
they had done during experimental Phase I. E also said: 
1~ould you mind also doing these two 
questions, which are similar to the ones you did last 
time. They are not timed". 
When the booklet was finished, S was directed 
to Experimental Room 1 and once again seated. 
The Choice/Anonymous subjects were addressed as 
follows: 
"I need to see you briefly once more to 
determine your reaction to the experiment. It is best 
that we meet as close as possible to seven days time." 
A Phase III appointment time was then made, 
and, as S watched, E wrote the subject code number 
(not the name) beside the specified time and day. As 
the appointment was made E ensured S realized some 
anonymity was bei11g respected by repeating the code 
number as he wrote. S was additionally given an 
appropriately filled out appointment card corresponding 
to Phase III. 
There were some differences in the procedure 
for the Choice/Public condition subjectse Once seated, 
these subjects were addressed as follows: 
'¼s I mentioned, I need to see you briefly 
once more. It is best that we meet as close as 
possible to seven days time". 
However, while arranging the appointment for 
relative publicity· of S's requirements. With the 
appointment book in S's view, E repeated her name as 
he wrote this besi<le the specified time and day. 
Once again, S was given a new appointment card as a 
reminder of her Phase III commitment. 
As both the Choice/Anonymous and the Choice/ 
Public subjects were handed their Phase III 
appointment cards, the concluding remarks were 
addressed to each subject: 
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"Finally, when all experimenting is complete, 
I will attend your class on studyday to explain the 
exact nature of the study and your role in it. You 
will also be welcome to ask me any questions. 
It is important to the results of this 
experiment that you do not discuss any aspect of 
what you were required to do with anyone, until the 
study is completed. I would like you to agree not 
to discuss anything until the experiment is over, and 
I attend your class". 
At this point E paused for affirmation of 
his request, which was readily given. 
The reminder concerning debriefing was 
important both as reassurance that they would not be 
"left in the dark", and as a counter for the questions 
subjects often tried to ask, while we were arranging 
their Phase III appointment. 
The reasons for the "limited period" secrecy 
are fairly self-evident, notably as they would relate 
to prior expectations of the subjects who had been 
spoken to. 
A limited period of secrecy is considerably 
more realistic than the more commonly used request to 
"never breathe a word of this". The latter approach 
cannot be monitored and is unlikely to be adhered to 
anyway, as people have a strong tendency to talk about 
such novel experiences. 
The more realistic request of a "limited 
period" of secrecy was more likely to be upheld, as 
it promised an eventual release for their (often very 
pressing) thoughts coupled with the valid reason E 
gave them for his request. 
In addition, the approach used by this study 
of monitoring the success of the secrecy request 
entailed a more reliable means than the usual one of 
simply asking a question (and nothing else). More 
specifics of such monitoring are included in the 
Phase III section. 
Unlike the approach of Nuttin (1975) and 
others, this study incorporated no requirement of a 
formal signed secrecy declaration~ as this could 
affect the anonymity of the anonymous condition 
subjects. It would also tend to reduce the distance 
between the anonymous subjects at one end of the 
relative publicity continuum, and the public subjects 
at the other, 
The above comments in no way relate to Phase II, 
as the counterattitudinal task is already completed, 
and any attitude change already measured by the second 
administration of the Attitude questionnaire. 
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However, the Attitude questionnaire was still 
to be administered a third time (Phase III) and it is 
here that a signed declaration may have had its 
uncontrolled effect. 
This refers to groups G to L, as indicated 
on Figure 3 (seep. 60). 
The introductory procedure for subjects of 
these six groups was identical (word for word) to that 
experienced by groups A to F (Refer p. 61). 
However, the procedure dealing with the 
explanation of the counterattitudinal task was 
different in accordance with the intention to give 
subjects relatively "No choice" as regards refusal or 
compliance. After displaying the three assignment 
sheets in front of s, E said: 
to do. 
"I will now turn to what you are required 
You are required to write as many points as 
you can in support of each of three statements, 
which you see here at the top of these three pages. 
You ·will have exactly five minutes to write on each 
one. You are required to make your points as 
convincing and persuasive as you are able. At the end 
of the first five minutes, I will take your first sheet 
and will give you the second headed sheet. When you 
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have finished the second sheet, I will give you the 
third headed sheet so you can write your third 
assignment. I realise that you may not agree with 
the statements so you will be paid $($5, $3 or $1) 
immediately out of available research funds provided 
for the purpose". 
vlhen addressing the public condition 
subjects (Groups G, Hand I), E said: 
"Your completed sheets will need to be signed 
so that your effort will not be anonymous. I am 
asking each person to come again once more. You 
will be expected to briefly defend what you have 
written to an assistant of mine (Other nurses will be 
doing something else for the same period of time). 
This is what is required of you. Now here is the first 
headed sheet, you had best get started". 
The last part of these instructions were 
intended to be slightly "pushy", minimizing any sense 
of choice. 
The decision time was taken, the appropriate 
financial incentive handed over, and S was started on 
her assignments in identical manner to that of the 
six choice groups (Groups A to F). 
When addressing the No Choice/Anonymous 
subjects (Groups J, Land L), E said: 
"Your completed sheets do not have to be 
signed, so that your effort will be anonymous. No 
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one else will see the completed sheets. This is what 
is required of you. Now here is the first headed 
sheet. You had best get started". 
Again, the decision time was taken, the 
financial incentive delivered, and S directed to start 
the first of the three assignments. The delivery 
collection and timing of the three counterattitudinal 
assignments was identical with the procedure used with 
the Choice (Public and Anonymous) subjects (Groups 
A to F). However, the presentation of the questionnaire 
booklet involved more of a mild demand than a request. 
E said: 
"Here are two questionnaires t? do, which 
are similar to the ones you did last time. They are 
not timed". 
The final part of the Phase II procedure was 
identical to that used for the Choice groups, with 
respect to arranging the Phase III appointment, mention 
of debriefing and "limited period" secrecy. Once 
again, the new appointment was made to emphasize the 
relative publicity of the No Choice/Public subjects 
and the anonymity of the No Choice/Anonymous. subjects. 
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Control Subjects (Group M) 
Once again, the Control subjects were randomly 
allocated to group M, by use of their arrival order. 
For example, after the first twelve Experimental 
subjects had complied, the thirteenth arrival became 
the first Control subject. 
The Control subjects were greeted in an 
initially identical manner to the Experimental subjects. 
That is, they were reassured as regards E's credentials 
and intention to provide adequate post-experimental 
debriefing. 
However, nothing was said concerning the 
counterattitudinal task as this was not required of 
the Control subjects. Instead Control subjects were 
given a copy of the questionnaire booklet (second 
edition) with the request: 
"I would like you to do these two 
questionnaires,which are similar to the ones you did 
last time. They are not timed". 
In the identical manner employed with the 
Experimental subjects, each Control subject was shown 
to a seat in Experimental Room 1. They were further 
instructed, as they sat down, to knock on the door 
(between the two rooms) when they had finished the 
questionnaire booklet. 
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When each control subject had finished the 
booklet, she was again seated in the experimental room 2. 
Ethen said: 
"I need to see you briefly once more, to 
determine your reaction to the experiment". 
A Phase III appointment was then arranged in the usual 
manner, by use of the subject's code number. Again, 
S was reminded of E's eventual post-experimental 
debriefing, as well as the importance of a "limited 
perio~'of secrecy. 
It should be noted that E often had to deal 
with a succession of subjects on a concurrent basis. 
After the initial interview for example, Sl would 
commence her first assignment 1:'!hile E 10101-1_lcl t-hen 
interview S2. At the busiest times, three subjects 
would be seated in the lecture room, at different 
stages of their task. 
To ensure no talking or comparison of their 
task occurred, E always seated subjects on the end 
of every second row. At no time were subjects seated 
on the same row. E remained alert for any signs of 
communication. On the very occasional instances of 
such transgression, E good-humouredly cautioned the 
subjects concerned, who always responded appropriately. 
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In the case of two or more subjects having 
arrived together for the experiment, E added an extra 
caution, at the final part of Phase II. 
Where concurrent subject experimenting was 
necessary, careful use of several stop-watches and a 
pattern of task material was necessary. There were 
surprisingly few difficulties with a fairly complex 
operation. 
5) Experimental Phase II 
This final experimental phase served several 
important purposes. 
i) Provide a measure of the temporal 
stability of any attitude change. 
ii) Check the success of manipulation of 
choice, as reflected by perceived choice. 
iii) Subjective rating of the assignments 
persuasiveness. 
iv) Check adherence to a "limited period" 
of secrecy. 
v) Ensure the validity of the counter-
attitudinal nature of the task. 
vi) Question subjects as to why they complied 
with the counterattitudinal request. 
vii) Ensure no subject had managed to discover 
the true purpose of the study. 
viii) Ensure an acceptably high level of the 
experimenter's credibility. 
ix) Gauge the general and specific reaction 
of each subject to the experiment. 
The procedure for Phase III, relating to each 
purpose will be described in turn. 
i) Provide a measure of tem:e_oral stabilitz 
of Attitude change 
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As each subject arrived in accordance with their 
experimental Phase III appointment, they were greeted 
and handed a questionnaire booklet. The booklet was 
identical to that used in the previous experimental 
phases, with the usual exception that the order of the 
items had been randomized. E addressed each subject 
thus: 
"I would be grateful if you would do these 
questionnaires, which are very similar to those you 
have completed recently. 
timed". 
Once again, they are not 
As E directed S into Experimental Room 2 
he said: 
"Please knock on the door as soon as you 
are finished". 
In reference to point (i)(above), the 
12 question of the stability of attitude change is 
largely overlooked in research related to the field. 
Nuttin (1975) is one welcome exception to such neglect.· 
Thus, the third administration of the questionnaire 
booklet was primarily intended to gauge the absolute 
stability of attitude change with time, in addition to 
the relative attitude change between the Experimental 
and the Control groups. 
12 This relates only to the Attitude questionnaire 
77. 
To return to procedural details, when S 
indicated her completion of the booklet, she was shown 
into Experimental no_om 1, with the comment: 
"Would you mind sitting here for a few minutes, 
as I have a few questions to ask?" 
ii) Check the success of manipulation of 
choice as reflected by perceived cnoice 
E placed a piece of paper in front of S with 
the following scale transcribed: 
Almost complete High degree Mod.degree Slight degree No Choice 
degree of choice of choice of choice of choice at all 
• • • • • • • • • . . . . 
As S viewed the scale, E asked the first 
question: 
Ql: "Did you feel obliged to undertake the writing of the 
three assignments when you were last here? How much 
choice did you feel that you had in the decision to 
write the assignments, or to refuse to. Please 
mark the one point that best describes the degree 
of choice you felt you were given. 
I 
You will see 
that there are 13 points, from here (E point to the 
high end of the scale) to there (E indicates low end 
of scale). You simply mark one of the points". 
At this stage, S marked one of the points, thus 
rating the perceived choice she felt E allowed. Ethen 
read back the label immediately above the point Shad 
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marked, to ensure that she had made no mistake. 13 
As indicated by point ii, the subjects rating 
of perceived choice was a check on the success of the 
intended experimental manipulation of choice. Naturally, 
it was anticipated that the mean perceived choice would 
be significantly larger for groups A to F (Choice groups) 
than for groups G to L (No choice groups). 
iii) Subject-ive rating of the assignments 
Persuasiveness 
E placed before S the counterattitudinal 
assignments she had written and commented: 
"I would like you to briefly read your three 
assignments". 
When she had read her assignments, a piece of 
paper with the following scale was placed before her. 
Completely Highly Moderately Slightly Not 
or nearly Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive 
completely at all-
persuasive 
• • • • • • • • • ' . , 
E said: 
Q2 "Please note how persuasive you feel your first 
(second, third) assignment was. Once again, there are 
thirteen points ranging from here (E indicates one end 
13 This reading back of the rating proved useful. At least 
one subject had mistakenly rated herself, and altered the 
rating with the comment: "Oh, I didn't mean that. I've 
got that round the wrong way". 
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of the scale) to there (E indicates other end of the 
scale). Mark the one point that best indicates how 
persuasive you feel your first (second, third) 
assignment was." 
Again, E read back the three ratings14 , to 
affirm she had completed same to her own satisfaction. 15 
E commented aloud on the three ratings and their 
relation to each other. For example: 
11 I see that you consider all three assignments 
to be moderately persuasive,but that two of these were 
identically persuasive, while the third assignment was 
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"Do you mind if I tape-record the rest of this 
interview, as it saves me taking notes. If you do object, 
I am quite happy to take notes, although it is a little 
slower". 
16 
14By a connection, E knew which rating referred to which 
essay; (1) (2) and (3) indicated, respectively, the first 
second and third assignments. 
15once again, an occasional subject altered her ratings. 
16only one subject voiced any initial objection. A second 
subject indicated early in the interview, thatfue tape 
recorder "put her off"; it was then switched off, and 
notes taken, verbatim. 
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If the S replied that she had no objection to 
the use of the tape recorder, it was plugged in and the 
microphone placed on her side of the desk. (Otherwise, 
E simply took notes of S's replies verbatim.) E 
continued: 
"Before I say anything more, could I ask you 
to answer questions as frankly as possible, as otherwise 
I will not have accurate information". 
Ethen continued to ask each subject the 
remaining questions, in identical order and phrasing. 
The exact order of the questions is shown by 
the numerical sequence (hence Ql, Q2, Q3, etc.) Having 
said as much, the questions will not necessarily be in 
numerical order, as this allows a more even correspondence 
with the nine points, initially listed at the start of 
this section (p.75). 
iv) Check adherence to a "limited period': 
of secrecy. 
Q4 "It is crucial that you answer the next question as 
honestly as possible. Did you manage not to discuss 
what you were required to do with any other nurses? 
It does not matter if you have discussed things, but 
I do need to know". 
The repetition of the caution concerning 
honesty, coupled with the reassurance that E was unlikely 
to be upset, maximized the likelihood that the question 
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would be truthful1y answered. In addition, E asked 
the question in a pleasant, friendly and reassuring 
manner. 
If a subject admitted that she had not 
strictly adhered to the secrecy requirement, E questioned 
her at some length, and in detail, although still in a 
friendly manner. Specifically, E asked exactly what 
had been mentioned. He also invited the particular 
subject concerned to name the subjects she had spoken 
to. Subjects were quite agreeable to furnishing 
names, 17 thus providing a means of counter-checking. 
The method used was by no means infallible, 
but markedly more reliable than the procedure many 
investigators who asked the relevant question, and 
made no attempt to follow-up the reply. 
v) Ensure the Validity of the Counter-
attitudinal nature of the Task 
E read out in turn each assignment heading, 
asking the question: 
Q5 "Do you really agree with this statement?" 
Barring sufficient attitude change as would change 
a person from one to its opposite, it was expected that 
replies to Q6 would be negative. If a subject replied in 
the affirmative, E carefully checked the rating on all 
three attitude questionnaires, and closely questioned her. 
17only one subject refused this ·request. 
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If sufficient attitude change·had occurred, since the 
completion of the counterattitudinal assignments, to 
change her attitude to its opposite, validity was 
upheld. Other reasons lead to the subject being 
eliminated from analysis (see Results Table 20, p. 146). 
vi) Question subjects as to ~hy they complied 
with the counterattitudinal request 
E had confirmed the validity of the task, as 
outlined in the immediately preceding section. He 
continued: 
Q6 "So you wrote assignments against your personal 
views. Why do you think you agreed to this task, 
where you had to write assignments opposite to 
your own personal views?" 
The inclusion of this question is a reaction 
against the many investigations that merely assume that 
the reasons for compliance ar~ purely financial 
vii) Ensure no subject had managed to discover 
the true purpose of the study, 
Q8 "What would you consider was the purpose of this 
experiment? What do you think I am trying to do?" 
E followed up any comments that sounded like 
partial insights, delving carefully into the details of 
what the particular subject was saying. 
SJ. 
viii) Ensure an RcceptablI high level of the 
experimenter's cred'ib:LITtypertained". 
To subjects in which relative publicity was 
maximized (Groups A,B,C,G,H, and I), E addressed the 
following: 
Q7 "When I told you that you would have to defend what 
you had written to an assistant of mine, did you 
believe me?" 
When S replied, E debriefed her to the extent 
of telling her that this was not required: 
"Well, you will not have to do that. How 
do you feel about that?" 
To subjects in whom anonymity had been 
stressed ( ~,..,r,,1n cc: n ~ li' J l( ,::, nrl T ) li' c:,,::, -f rl • ,----1:"- -,.....,.,-' , .... , ............ _ .--JJ ~ -~ .............. 
"When I told you that what you wrote would be 
fairly anonymous, did you believe me. Of course, I am 
able to check and see whose name I have. However; by 
'anonymous' I mean that no-one else would see what you 
had written." 
Obviously this question was less straight-
forward than its immediately preceding counterpart. 
The realisation that 'anonymity' was only of a relative 
nature (because of E's access to their names) was 
reflected in the need for extra clarification with some 
subjects. 
ix) Gatige the general and specific reaction of 
each subject to the e,xper:linent 
E asked~ 
Q3 "How would you feel towards doing another experiment 
like this one,·if ever you were asked?" 
Both negative and tentative replies were 
explored further, to determine exact reasons for any 
voiced misgivings. 
Q9 11If your best friend knew you had written assignments 
opposite to your own views, what would she think 
of you?" 
E clarified the question where necessary, and 
questioned subjects more closely to expand or clarify 
incomplete replies. 
Q12 "How much did you hesitate before agreeing to write 
the assignments". 
This question provided E with an insight into 
how aware, or otherwise each subject was of her 
decision time. 
Q11 nHow pleasant did you find the writing of the 
assignments?" 
If a subject indicated any negative reactions 
in this context, E probed further. In particular, E was 
interested to determine whether the subject attributed 
negative connotations to the counterattitudinal nature 
of the task, the effect of any writing tas~, or some 
other factor. It was not simply assumed that it was 
the counterattitudinal element that caused negative 
feelings. 
Q13 "If you were asked to defend what you have written 
in the assignments to some nurses in a couple of 
months time, how would you feel about that?" 
If necessary E posed the additional question: 
"Do you think you would be willing to do that?" 
Subjects replying in the negative were questioned further 
to discover their reasons. E finally said: 
"I am not going to ask you to do that, I 
simply wanted your reaction to the question". 
Q14 "Is there anything else you would particularly like 
to say about this study?" 
This was the final question of the interview, 
designed to allow any "untapped" idiosyncratic reactions. 
Ethen concluded experimental Phase III as follows: 
"As I mentioned last time, I will be coming 
along to your class in the near future to explain the 
exact nature of this study and your specific role in it. 
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However, until that time I would like you to agree to 
continue not to discuss anything with any other nurses. 
The reason is that I still have some other nurses to 
see before I am finished". 
Ethen showed each subject to the door with 
the comment: 
"I am very grateful for the help you have 
been. Thank you for taking part". 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Overview of results and analysis 
The results can be summarized under the three 
headings, Primary, Secondary and: Experimental Checks. 
These headings are partly arbitrary and there is some 
overlap, but allow some degree of form to the results. 
The Primary results are those which relate to the 
Experimental Hypotheses and the dependent variable, 
namely attitude change. 
Under the counterattitudinal task, the dependent 
variable was immediately measured (Initial Attitude Change), 
and again after a delay which averaged five days (Final 
Attitude Change). 
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to the experimental Hypotheses or dependent variable. 
These include:-
i) Compliance and Refusal, with respect to the 
counterattitudinal task and reasons given for 
either decision. 
ii) Decision time, with respect to Compliance or 
Refusal. 
iii) Assignment analysis, with respect to persuasiveness. 
iv) Qualitative data; how subjects reacted to the study, 
The Exper'ime·ntal ch'e·cks determine the success of the 
intended experimental manipulations, and therefore the 
validity of the entire experiment. Included in this 
category are:-




















vi) Adherence to the "limited period" secrecy request. 
vii) Validity of the counterattitudinal nature of the 
task. 
viii) Ensure an acceptably high level of E's credibility. 
ix) Ensure no subject had managed to discover the 
true purpose of this study. 
x) Ensure homogeneity of subject population. 
An examination of the data relating to the 
experimental checks yielded a number of results that were 
eliminated from analysis. 
The format of result presentation will include a· 
table where necessary, written presentation of a result, as 
well as a brief discourse of statistical analysis where 
necessary.. Each result will be discussed, al though the 
next section Discussion, will examine the results in the 
wider context of the whole field of related research, and 
its significance to the latter. 
Primary Results 
TABLE 1 
The Split Plot Design for analysis of variance 
of type SPF22J.J (SPF-p.q.) used with Primary 
results 
Within S Treatments 
bl 02 bJ Group 
acd 111 S 1-6 S 1-6 S 1-6 A 
acd 112 S 7-12 S 7-12 S 7-12 B 
acd 113 S13-18 SlJ-18 SlJ-18 C 
acd 121 S19-24 S19-24 S19-24 D 
acd 122 S25-JO S25-30 S25-30 E 
acd 123 S31-36 S31-36 S31-36 F 
acd 211 S37-li-2 S37-42 S37-42 G 
acd 212 S43-48 S43-li-8 S43-li-8 H 
acd 213 849-54 S49-54 Sli-9-54 I 
acd 221 S55-60 S55-60 S55-60 J 
acd 222 S61-66 s61-66 s61-66 K 
acd 223 S67-72 S67-72 S67-72 L 
Both sets of data for Initial and Final attitude 
change were subject to an identical design, for the purpose 
of general analysis. The model used was a Split ~lot 
Factorial des~gn for the Analysis of Variance, 1 which 
follows the notation SPF-p.q. (P. 245-293 Kirk, 1968). 
The letter "p" refers to the levels of Between block (or 
subject) treatments, or, in other words, the non-repeated 
factor(s).Conversely the letter "q" refers to the levels of 
Within block (or subject} treatments, or, in other words, 
the repeated factor(s). 
In the context of the current study, the specific 
numerical form of the SPF-p.q. notation, was SPF-223.3. 
There were two levels of Choice (a1 and a 2 ) two levels of 
Relative Publicity (c1 and c 2 ) and three levels of financial 
Incentive (d1 , d 2 and d 3 ); these were the non-repeated 
factors. The final factor was personal Involvement, which 
' 
was the repeated one, and had three levels (b1 , b 2 and b 3). 
Table 1 (above} is the statistical equivalent of 
Table 2. It can be seen that each of the six subjects per 
group, complete three levels of the Involvement factor 
(b1 , b 2 and b 3 ). The actual group names are provided in 
the final column of the table. 
The Table is a modified version of that given by 
Kirk (1968, p.294). 
Data for Initial and Final attitude change was 
analysed by computer, on a ·Biomedical statistical package 
for the Analysis of Variance, code-named BMD 08V. The 
data are summarised in Tables 2a and 2b. 
1 
Also known as Repeated measures Analysis of Variance. 
90 . 
. TABLES' 2a· AND' '2b 
Tables show both Group and Overall attitude change means 
for subjects writing assignment of Low, Medium and High 
personal Involvement. · · 
TABLE '2a 





























GROUP INITIAL MEAN ATTITUDE 
NAME CHANGE AT 3 LEVELS OF 
· · · · · · · · PERSONAL 'INVOLVEMENT 
Low Med High l\'.lean 
A 0.500 0.500 0.667 0.556 
B 0.333 0.667 0 0.333 
C 2.167 1.667 1. 833 1.889 
D 0.167 1.667 0.667 0.834 
E 1. 000 1.167 1.000 1.056 
F 1.000 0.667 0.167 0.611 
G 0.167 1. 667 1.167 1.000 
' H 1.167 0.500 0.167 0.611 
I 1.003 0.333 0.333 0.556 
J 0.833 1.667 0 0.833 
K 0.667 0.333 0 0.111 
L 0.833 0.333 0.333 0.500 
M 0.667 1.000 0.167 0.611 
(9.820) (0.917) (0.528)0.741 
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. TABLE' '2b · 
FINAL ATTITUDE' CHANGE 
RELATIVE AMOUNT OF GROUP FINAL MEAN ATTITUDE CHANGE 
GHOICE PUBLICITY INCENTIVE NAME AT 3 LEVELS OF PERSONAL 
................... .'. INVOLVEMENT. .. , . .' .' ........... . 
Low Med High Mean 
Hi A 0.667 0 0.500 0.389 
Public 
Med B 0.167 0.500 I 0 0.111 
Choice 
Lo. C 1. 833 0.667 0.833 1.111 
Hi D 0.500 0.833 1.000 0.778 
.Anon. 
Med E 1.500 0.333 1.167 1. 000 
Lo F 1.667 0.667 0.167 0.834 
Hi G 0.167 1.000 0 0.389 
Public 
Med H 1.333 0.167 0.333 0.389 
No 
Choice Lo - I 1.333 0.167 0.333 0.611 
Hi J 0.500 2.333 0 0.944 
- I l'...non. Med V 
, /'H\f\ ') (\ (\ (\ , "" , ......... ... , ..a..• V V V L..oVVV .... vv .I.. JJJ 
Lo L 0.333 0.338 0.167 0.056 
Control M 1.167 0 0 0.389 
Grand Means 0.917(0.611)0.403 0.644 i 
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Output consisted of a series of tables to demonstrate 
the effects of "pure" factors (that is, non-~interactive 
ones; Choice, Relative Publicity, Incentive), first order 
interactions (for example, Choice, Relative Publicity), 
second order interactions (for example Choice, Relative 
Publicity, Incentive) and the third order interaction 
(Interaction of all factors). Various means were also 
included in the output as well as F ratios and estimates 
of variance components. 
To determine if the experimental hypotheses were 
upheld, finer analysis was carried out, which included 
t-tests and examination of a series of graphs (seep. 99). 
Hypothesis 1 
TABLE 3 
Summar table of between and within subject factors 
non-interactiona 
INITIAL ATTITUDE CHANGE 
Source ss DF MS F Signif-
Between subjects icance 
Choice 4.167 1 4.167 1.s73 ns 
Relative Publicity 1.500 1 1.500 0.674 ns 
Incentive 5.148 2 2.574 1.157 ns 
Within Subjects 
Involvement 5.009 2 2.505 1.516 ns 
FINAL ATTITUDE CHANGE 
Source 
Between subjects 
Choice 0.074 1 0.074 o. 031 ns 
Publicness 6.000 1 6.000 2.523 ns 
Incentive 0.065 2 0.032 0.014 ns 
Within Subjects 
Involvement 8.787 2 .4.394 3.163 * 
Key: ns = not significant 
* = significant at 0.05 level·of confidence 
Only one factor yielded an F value which was of 
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sufficient magnitude to attain statistical significance 
(p ( 0. 05). Yet, even this value was only significant for 
the Final attitude change data. 
It is advisable to consult th~ corresponding 
Estimates of Variance Components, before making final 
comments on the impact of significant F values, because 
there is a linear relationship between the number of subjects 
and magnitude of F. In other words, the_ greater the number. 
of subjects per cell, the greater the likelihood that the 
F value will attain statistical significance. 
On the other hand, Estimates of Variance Components 
( (deviation)2) 
( df ) are free of such effects attributable 
( component ) 
to subject numbers. 
The significant value for Involvement (Final) 
accounts for 4.173% of the variance, with a component value 
of 0.0417. 
mt-..- --- _.: __ .:.c.:---.1.- ___ .,. ____ _ .c , ___ ,,_ ,, __ .,.._ ~. ·' . ., 
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Final data account for either negligible or zero variance. 
Error variance, in both cases, accounts for most of the 
total variance. 
Of the Initial Attitude change F values, the factor 
Choice followed by Involvement are the closest to 
attaining statistical significance. Of the Final Attitude 
change F values, apart from the significant Involvement one, 
th~ only other even approaching significance is Relative 
Publicity. 
The cell means of the non-repeated (Between Subjects) 
factors were as follows. (As a result of the non-significance 
of the F values, not-tests were performed, to test if the 
differences between the means of the levels were significant. 
TABLE' 4 
Cell attitude change means (Initial and Ftnal) for 
the Between subject factors 
INITIAL FINAL 
Factors 1 2 3 1 2 
.. 
Cho;i.ce 0.880 0.602 - o·. 66 7 0.630 
Relative 0.824 0.657 - 0.481 0.815 Publicity 






The cell means for the repeated (Within subjects) 
factor, Involvement, was as follows: 
TABLE 5 
Cell attitude change means (Initial and Final) for 
the Within subject factor (Involvement). 
INITIAL FINAL 
Lo Med Hi Lo Med 
Involvement 0.820 0.875 0.528 0.917 0.611 
Hi 
0.403 
As the F value for the Initial attitude change was 
non-significant, it was assumed that none of the differences 
between the level means attained statistical significance. 
However, t-t.ests (Related measures) were carried out to test 
for significant differences between the means of the different 
levels of Involvement, of the Final attitude change values. 
However, only the difference between the Low Mean 
(0.917) and High Mean (0.403), was of sufficient magnitude 
to attain statistical significance (tll = 2.761, p(.01), 
although this was at a very high level (.01 level). 
A combination of the Initial and Final Involvement 
means yields values that are inversely related to attitude 
change. That is, as the level of Involvement increases, the 
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amount of attitude change decreases (Lo = 0.869, .Med ;::: 
0.743 and Hie 0.466). However, none of these were 
sufficiently different from the oth~rs, to reach statistical 
significance. Notice that the inverse effect was apparent 
in the Final attitude change figures, but not the Initial 
ones. 
Disc·ussion 
The first hypothesis was upheld in that personal 
Involvement had an effect of at least equal impact, as 
the factors Frey and Irle considered so definitive - Choice 
Relative Publicity and financial Incentive. Involvement 
had a_ greater effect as the only statistically significant 
results were associated with this factor. However, as 
most Involvement results did not reach statistical 
significance, one hestitates to draw conclusions other than 
the one relating to the confiri:nation of the first 
Both the Combined (Initial and Final averaged) 
and Final Involvement means were inversely related to 
attitude change. However, only one mean difference 
attained statistical significance, so caution must be shown 
in making any conclusions. 
Intuitively, it would appear that a person would be 
more likely to exhibit attitude change in issues he was 
not too :concerned about, than others he might fight for. 
However, the inverse pattern associated with 
Involvement, was stronger than any distinct pattern 
associated with amount of Incentive, and attitude change. 
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Hypothesis 2 (i, ii, iii). 
The Interactions of the factors do not directly 
relate to Hypothesis 2. However, the second order inter-
action of Choice. R~lative Publicity.Incentive (C.RP.Inc) 
does bear on Frey and Irle's predictions. Specifically, 
the first step in the upholding of their predictions with 
respect to conditions favouring either an Incentive or a 
Dissonant effect, would be a statistically significant C.RP.Inc 
interaction. The following two tables present F ratios of 
this particular interaction, in addition to the 
others which are of less interest • 
. TABLE' 6 
Summary table of Between and Within subject factor Inter-
actions.First, Second and Third order interactions are 
shown for both Initial and Final attitude change values. 
INITIAL ATTITUDE CHANGE 
Source ss DF MS F Sign if ic" ance · 
Between Subjects 
Choice,Relative Publicity 0.296 1 0.296 0.133 ns 
Choice Incentive 8.111 2 4.056 1.824 ns 
Relative Publicity. Incentive 6.778 2 3.389 1.524 ns 
Ch.RP.Inc. 14.037 2 3.156 3.156 * 
Within Subjects 
Choice Involvement 1.028 2 0.514 0.311 ns 
Relative Publicity Inv'lment 0.861 2 0.431 0.261 ns 
Incentive Involvement 14.991 4 3.748 2.269 ns 
Ch.RP. Inv. 1.398 2 0.699 0.423 ns 
Ch.Inc.Inv. 4.028 4 1. 007 0.611 ns 
RP.Inc.Inv. 4.694 4 1.174 0.711 ns 
Ch.RP.Inc.Inv. 3.761 4 0.942 0.570 ns 
FINAL ATTITUDE CHANGE 
Source ss DF MS F Signific· ance 
Betwe·e·n· 'S'ubJe·cts 
Choice.Relative Publicity 0,296 ·1 0.296 0.125 ns 
Choice Incentive . 10. 954. 2 5.477 2.303 ns 
Relative Publicity.Incentive17.194 2 8.597 3.616 * 
Ch. RP. Inc. o:676 2 0.338 0.142 ns 
TABLE '6' · (co·nt' d) • 




Relative Publicity Iriv'lment4,361 






















4 • 3 3 8. 3 ·• 12 3 * 
2.181 1.570 ns 
4.120 2.953 * 
1.032 0.743 ns 
2·. 4.91 1.793 ns 
0.319 ·0.230 ns 
1.282 0.923 ns 
ns = not significant 
* = significant at 
0.05 level of 
confidence. 
The C.RP.Inc. interaction was statistically 
significant for the Initial but not for. the Final 
attitude change values. Only one of the first order 
interactions involving combinations of these three factors, 
is statistically significant; Relative Publicity Incentive is 
significant at the 0.05 level, but only for the Final 
attitude change values. 
Two of the first order interactions involvi~g 
Involvement are statistically significant but only for the 
Final attitude change values. 
Discussion 
Most of these interactions are of minimal interest to 
the study. 
However, the C.RP.Inc interaction has bearing on 
Frey and Irle's predictions and the fact that only one value 
proved significant offers little support for Frey and Irle, 
as well as for Incentive and Dissonance theories in_ general. 
In a sense, there was no need to_ graph the Final 
attitude change values (see page 99 and the following pages). 
However,it was nevertheless considered worthwhile ~o see if 
the predicted direction (Inverse or Direct) occurred in 
accordance with the conditions Frey and Irle considered 
optimum for a Dissonant or Incentive effect to occur. 
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There may be some importance in the fact the inter-· 
actions that were significant, featured the factor Involvement 
just as frequently as the other three factors Frey and Irle 
considered so crucial. If so, Hypothesis.l is more closely 
implicated. 
Consideration of this hypothesis required an 
examination firstly of the means of groups: A, B arid C 
(Choice/Public groups), secondly of J, Kand L (No Choice/ 
Anonymous groups) and thirdly, groups DEF and GHI (Choice/ 
Anonymous and No Choice/Public respectively). Figs. 4, ~ 6, and 
7 respectively, contain the results for these four groupings 
of results. 
Note the graphs la to 4a show the Initial attitude 
change values while the graphs lb to 4b show the concomitant 
Final attitude change values. Three graphs show the values 
of High, Medium.and Low involvement respectively for 
Initial and Final attitude change values. (la to 3a and 
lb to 3b). The graphs represent an average of the other six; 
thus level of Involvement has been excluded from 
consideration here 4a and 4b). Each point in the graph 
represents its relevant group and is so labelled. 
In Fig. 4 the Choice/Public groups are presented 
for which Frey and Irle predicted the Dissonant inverse 
relationship between increasing amounts of financial 
incentive and attitude change. 
In all. graphs, with the one exception of 2a, the same 
pattern occurs, namely an "uneven V'', with the $1.00 value 
showing the most attitude change, $5.00 value second, and 
the $3.00 value exhibiting least change. 
FIGURE 4 



































Key: Abscissa refers to amount of Financial Incentive. 
Ordinate refers to amount of attitude change. 
Minus values depict strengthening of S's original 
attitude. 
~his key holds for Figs. 4 to 7) 
H = High degree of personal involvement 
M = Medium degree of personal involvement 
t = Low degree of personal involvement 






FIGURE 4 (CONT~) 
Graphed means of Final attitude change£~£ 
_rou s A Band C Choice Public where Frey 
an_ Ire predicted an Inverse Relation etween 





































The exceptional pattern ~(2a), was the only graph 
illustrating a pattern at all similar to that predicted 
by Frey and Irle. Thus, regardless of whether level 
of Involvement is taken into account (la and b, 2 a and b, 
3a and b) or not (4a and b), the predicted inverse pattern did 
not occur. 
If the middle financial value ($3;00} is excluded 
from consideration, and a straight line drawn between the 
remaining two points, the predicted inverse pattern occurs in 
all graphs. 
Regardless of whether such a modification is 
justified, more difficulties arise for Frey and Irle's 
predictions. Dissonance theory claims that counter-
attitudinal behaviour, with respect to an issue of high 
personal involvement yields more dissonance and consequent 
attitude change than an issue of relatively less involvement. 
Therefore, the most attitude change should occur when the issue 
is of highest personal involvement (la and lb) for the subject 
with medium involvement (2a and b) and low involvement 
(3a and b), second and third, respectively. 
If the amount of attitude change at each level of 
involvement is calculated, the following table results. 
tthese correspond to graphs la, 2a, 3a, lb, 2b and 3b 
respectively}. 
. TABLE 7 














1 2 3 
1 2 3 
From Table 7 it is obvious that not one result was 
in the correct order in accordance with Dissonance theory. 
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Other difficulties arise for Frey and Irle's 
Dissonance theory predictions •. In reference to the graphs 
of Fig.4, some instances of either zero attitude change (la 
and lb) or a "boomerang" effect . (lb and 2b) are apparent. 
With the "boomerang" effect, the subject adheres even more 
closely to his pre-dissonance attitude. Dissonance 
theory predicts under the th~oretically conducive conditions, 
counterattitudinal dissonance and consequent attitude change. 
The theory in_ no way accounts for"boomerang"effects or 
zero attitude change. 
Finally, if t-tests of statistical significance are 
performed on the Overall_ group means (4a and 4b) in 
~igure 4), only two differences are of sufficient magnitude 
to be significant. This is apparent from the following Table • 
. TABLE. ·a 
Statistical significance of di'fferences between the 
Overall group means; corresponds to Fig. 4 (graphs 4a 
and 4b). · · 
GROUP::; 
£ Ji ll 
£ **** **** 
1l (@ NS 
A (@ (@ 
Key: * = sig. at .05 level of confidence 
** = sig. at • 025 level of.confidence 
*** = sig. at .01 level of confidence 
**** = sig. at .005 level of confidence 
NS = Not sig. at .05 level of confidence 
n.b. Encircled values represent Final 
attitude change. 
Discussion 
Even if the extra factor of Involvement is excluded, 
the results do not support Frey and Irle's contention, that 
such Dissonance conducive conditions (Choice/Public) will 
yield an inverse relationship between increasing amounts of 
incentive and attitude change. If Involvement is taken 
103. 
into consideration, the situation does not improve, 
Part of the difficulties with respect to the 
prediction of the inverse relation, were caused by the· · 
attitude changes for the Medium financial incentive subjects 
(group B). Deletion of such a_ group, in an attempt to 
obtain the inverse effect, is not justified. However, even 
if such a modification is effected, the situation is not 
really improved, as a consideration of Involvement-related 
predictions illustrated. 
Finally, only a minority of the results (ignoring 
Involvement) attained significance, which is the final blow, 
to Frey and Irle's predictions. 
With reference to Fig. 5, the Initial attitude change 
means form the "uneven V" pattern that occurred with the 
"Dissonant" groups(Fig.4). However, unlike the Dissonant values 
the low incentive ($1.00) does not produce the high point 
(or most attitude change). In fact, the Initial attitude 
change values fluctuate so that the middle and high 
incentive ones alternately account for the most attitude 
change. 
However, the Final attitude change means form a 
different pattern, that of an uneven "inverted V''. The 
change in pattern can be attributed to the paradoxical 
increase in attitude change for the Medium incentive value 
$3.00), from the Initial to the Final measurement. 
Regardless of whether level of Involvement is taken 
into account or not, Frey and Irle's prediction of an 
Incentive effect is not upheld. 
As with the "Dissonance". groups (Fig.4), the middle 
Incentive value causes the most difficulties for th~ 
prediction. If this point is deleted, the situation is even 
2· 00 
1 · 00 
FIGURE 5 
Graphed means of Initial attitude chan_ge fo£ 
Groups L Kand J (No Choice/Anonymous) where Fre 
an Ire nre icte a irect relation etween 
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less improved, than if the same modification is applied to 
the "Dissonance". groups. The overall means (Sa and Sb) 
doywith the modification, yield the direct relationship 
between increasing amounts of Incentive and attitude change. 
However, the predictions are not completely fulfilled if the 
level of Involvement is taken into consideration with the 
modification. The predicted direct linear relationship 
occurs in only one Initial attitude change graph, at the 
Medium level of Involvement (6a), and one Final Attitude 
change graph, specifically at the Low level of Involvement 
(7b). The incorrectly predicted patterns include two inverse 
Incentive-attitude change relationships (5a and 5b), and one 
horizontal plot (7a). Graph 6b was directly related, but was 
adjudged incorrect because the lowest Incentive value had 
"boomeranged" (See page 102) • 
As with the Dissonance groups (Fig.4) both zero 
-h-ng- --~ "~--------" '-'Hu..! C ClUU .UVUlllt:.L CU!':J effects undermine furthei 
Frey and Irle's contention, In graph 5a (High Involvement) 
two of the points are zero, while in graph 5b one point is 
zero. Two examples of a "boomerang" effect occur, one in 
graph 6a, and as mentioned above, one in graph 6b; both 
occur at the Medium level of Involvement. 
It was noted earlier in this passage, that the 
Overall values (8a and 8b) did form the direct relation-
ship predicted by Frey and Irle. However, setting aside 
for a moment the difficulties that arise if the factor 
Involvment was to be considered, none of the group means are 
significantly different from each other. This is 
demonstrated below in Table 9, where the 0.05 level of 
confidence is used as a basis for determining statistical 
C 
significance. The t-test (Unrelated measures) was 
employed -here. 
TABLE' 9 
Significance chart of mean group differences for the 












Key: NS= Not significant at the 0.05 level of 
confidence. 
Discussion 
Encircled values represent Final Attitude 
change group means. 
As with the "Dissonance" groups (Fig.4) once again, 
the results fail to adequately fulfil Frey and Irle's 
predictions of a direct and positive relationship between 
increasing amounts of Incentive and the dependent variable, 
attitude change. Comparitively, the Dissonance predictions 
while still inadequately fulfilled, were closer than with the 
Incentive groups, if the middle Incentive value was deleted. 
Deletion of the middle Incentive value is, of 
course, an unjustified modification but even this only barely 
improves the situation. The remaining Overall values, with 
such a modification, allow the correct plot, but consideration 
of the particular level of Involvement yielded more incorrect 
than correct predictions. The "boomerang" effects and zero 
attitude change,in the instances where they appear, create 
further difficulties. None of the Overall group means were 
statistically significant anyway. 
Thus far, Frey and Irle appear to have considered 
lOf~. 
too few factors in reaching their predictive conclusions, 
in view of the effect of including Involvement as a factor 
as well as including more than t'::'o levels of Incentive. 
Although speculative, it would seem possible that 
the addition of any further factors to increase the 
complexity of the situation, would cause even more problems 
for Frey and Irle's differential predictions. 
Hypothesis 2 (iii): Figures 6 (overleaf) and 7 deal with 
the Choice/Anonymous and No Choice/Public manipulations, 
where Frey and Irle predict no significant relationship 
between increasing amounts of Incentive and attitude change. 
TABLE 10 
Chart of statistical significance between the ,Overall 












Key: NS= Not si~nificant at the 0.05 level of 
confidence. 

















between the Overall 
correspon to Fig~ 
Key: NS= Not significant at the 0.05 level of 
confidence. 
Bracketed values represent Final 
Attitude change. 
Both Tables 10 and 11 demonstrate that there wer~ 
no differences of statistical significance, between the 
Overall group means, which is in accordance with Frey and 
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Irle'' s predictions. 
The non-s~gnificant results yield as much fluctuation 
as the Dissonance and Incentive groups including a direct 
positive relationship (10a in Fig.6), and if the Middle 
' i 
Incentive values are deleted, both direct and negative effects 
occur. Again, a "boomerang" effect (13b in Fig.7) and zero 
attitude change (13b) occur. 
Discussion 
In the light of the poor predictive success with 
both the "Dissonance" and "Incentive" groups (Figs. 4 and 5, 
respectively), the fulfilment of Frey and Irle's hypotheses 
here, has no significance. In addition, the same type of 
fluctuations occur as in the. "Dissonance" and "Incentive" 
groups, including both zero attitude change, and boomerang 
effects. 
To conclude discussion on Hypothesis 2, Frey and 
results whether or not the level of Involvement was taken 
into account. The Dissonance groups did not exhibit the 
Inverse relationship between increasing amounts of 
Incentive and attitude change. (Fig 4.) The "Incentive" 
groups did not exhibit the predicted Direct relationship 
between increasing amounts of incentive and attitude change 
(Fig.5) The confirmation of the predicted results in the 
Choice/Anonymous (Fig. 6) and No choice/Public g·roups (Fig. 7) 
is rendered meaningless by the failure of the crucial two 
predictions concerning the Dissonant or Incentive effect. 
The deletion of the middle Incentive value tended to improve 
the results, with respect to Frey and Irle's predictions, if 
level of Involvement was not considered. Hypothesis 2 was 
114. 
therefore not confirmed. 
Tempora·1 Stability 'o'f' ·attitude· 'change· 
As mentioned in page J2 (Procedure), the study 
provided for a third administration of the Attitude 
questionnaire during Phase III, to check the stability of any 
attitude change which may have occurred as a consequence of 
the counterattitudinal task in Phase II. The Initial 
attitude change and the Final attitude change means were presented 
in Tables 2a and 2b respectively (see pages 90 and 91). 
Generally, there is a decrement from the Initial 
to the Final measurement of the dependent variable, although 
of insufficient magnitude to attain statistical significance 
(0.05 level}. 
The Grand mean for Initial attitude change is 0.741 
while the corresponding value for Final attitude change is 
0.644. The difference (0.099) is not statistically 
significant if at-test (Related. measures) is used (p)0.05). 
This difference is reflected in the pattern of 
relationships between.Initial and Final Experimental 
Group;means. · Specifically, the majority (n=8), show a 
decrement from the Initial to the Final measurement. 
However, once again, none of these differences are of 
sufficient magnitude to reach statistical significance 
(p> 0. 05). The differences range from O. 778 (Group C) to 
0.056 (Groups D and E). 
Four groups demonstrated incremental differences 
between the Initial and Final measurements of the 
dependent variable. The differences of these groups, namely F, 
I.,J. and K, ranged from 1.22 (K) to 0.055 (I), but none ~f 
these were statistically significant. 
115. 
The Control group (M) also showed a decremental difference 
between the Initial and Final measurements (0.222) which is 
greater than that of the Grand means (0.097). 
Finally, ii the Overall means, corresponding to the 
level of Involvement are examined, two support the general 
decremental trend (Medium and Low) while the third demonstrates 
an incremental difference. The respective differences for 
the Low, Medium and High Overall means were .+o. 097, -0. 306 
and -0.125. No differences were statistically 
significant (p > 0.05). 
Discussion 
Although the trend for the Initial to Final 
measurement of the dependent variable was decremental, 
none of these differences were of sufficient magnitude 
to be of statistical significance. In addition, the 
Control group exhibited the same trend, which was of 
slightly greater magnitude than the grand mean differences 
of the experimental groups. Finally, examination of both 
group means and overall involvement means yields some 
decremental differences, which are contradictory to the 
general trend. 
For the three reasons thus outlined, little 
importance can be placed on the general trend relating to 
temporal stability. One can then agree with the need to 
pay attention to temporal stability, as did Nuttin (1975). 
When consideting the experimental hypotheses, the need 
to measure attitude change twice is demonstrated as the 
factors had differential effects across each measurement. 
It should be recalled that the statistically significant 
results were almost entirely obtained with the final 
attitude change data. 
Therefore, consideration of temporal stability of 
the dependent variable does have merit, despite the 





Compliance with the Counterattitudinal Task and Refusal 
This study revealed a high level of compliance. 
Overall, 93 per cent of the trainee nurses who had 
attended experimental Phase II, agreed to perform the 
counterattitudinal task. The exact experimental 
location of the total refusals (n=7), is clearly shown 
in Table 12 (p.120). 
More refusals occurred in the choice groups 
(ABC DE and F) than the no choice groups (G HI J K 
and L), the numbers being, respectively, 5 (10.20%) and 
2(4.55%). However, the differences did not reach 
statistical significance. 
The first experimental group (A) accounted 
for a majority of the total refusals (42.86%), although 
it must be noted that these included the first three 
subjects of the total. 1 
1other slight patterns were apparent, but were not 
statistically significant, and probably accounted 
for by the first three subjects' decisions to refuse. 
One such pattern was the direct relation with amount 
of financial incentive; the High, Medium and Low 




Much of the research relating to attitude 
change does not report the rates of compliance, which 
raises the possibility of total cooperation. However, 
a very high rate usually upwards of 90 per cent, is 
reported by those studies that do comment on this 
aspect. The high rate of compliance in this study 
compares favourably with that of others. Cooper et al 
(1972), reported a rate of 95 per cent. 
The predominance of refusals in the choice 
groups may reflect relatively less coercion, than that 
experienced in the no choice groups. 
However, the differences did not reach 
statistical significance as noted. The first three 
subjects who refused, may have felt ill at ease with E, 
which may have influenced their decision. The fact that 
E initially felt nervous may have been a contributing 
factor in the decision of these initial subjects. 
Reasons for Compliance 
The reasons for compliance with the counter-
attitudinal task were requested during the final 
experimental phase - Phase III. Subjects were free to 
offer more than one reason, if they so desired, and 
these are presented in Table 13 (p. 121.). 
119. 
Actually, only a minority of the 
experimental subjects offered more than one reason for their 
compliance (n=30 or 41.67 per cent). The number of reasons 
given ranged from one to three. All subjects, except one 
were able to offer at least one reason. 
The reason "for the money" featured 
infrequently, being ranked ninth and accounting for 
only 2.91 per cent of the total. The reason accounting 
for most compliance was a feeling of commitment to the 
experiment, which represented 23.30 per cent of total 
responses. 
There was a distinction of perceived coercion, 
which yielded either the third or the fourth categories. 
Combined, these categories accounted for 21.36 per cent 
of all responses. The subjects who felt "requested" 
tended to be members of the No choice groups, as were 
those who felt they were "told" to do the counter-
attitudinal task. The No choice groups accounted for 
a total of 17 (77.27 per cent) of all these combined 
categories (22). 
Many subjects stated that they complied 
because they saw the task as a debating challenge. 
Her.ce the "challenge of a 'debate"' was ranked second 
in the list of reasons, which represented 18.45 per cent 
TABLE 12 
Compliance with,and Refusal of, the Counterattitudinal Task 
Choice Relative Amount of Group Compliances Percent Refusals Publicity Incentive Name 
$ 
5 A 8 72.73 3 
Public 3 B 8 88.89 1 
Choice 1 C 7 100 0 
5 D 6 85.71 1 
Anon. 3 E 7 100 0 
1 F $ 100 0 
5 G 8 100 0 
No Public 3 H 6 100 0 
Choice 1 I 7 87.50 1 
5 J 7 100 0 
Anon 3 K 7 87 .50 1 
1 L 7 100 0 
CONTROL 1 M 7 100 0 

































Reasons Given in Order of Frequency for Compliance 
With the Counteratt:Ltudinal Task 
Expressed as Integers and Percentages of Total 
Groups 
Reasons for Compliance A B C D E F G H I J 
Part of an expt. they had volunteered 0 3 () 4 3 1 3 0 2 2 
for. 
Challenge of a 'debate'. 1 4 J 2 0 J 0 4 1 0 
1J'!ere requested to. 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 2 3 
Were 'told' to (some coercion implied). 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 1 
Altruistic reasons. 3 0 
,., 
t, 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Importance of seeing both sides. 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Interesting or enjoyable. 0 0 ]_ 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 










For the money. 1 0 l 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 · 0 
Had mixed views anyway. 0 0 () 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Encourages stringent examination of 0 0 () 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
ovm values. 
Necessity of often doing things you 0 0 () 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
don't want to do. 
Miscellaneous 0 0 J. 1 l 0 0 0 0 l 0 
TOTAL REASONS GIVEN 


































of total responses. Other reasons, apart from the 
above, suggested feelings of "pleasure" included 
122. 
comments that it was "interesting or enjoyable" (3.88 per 
cent), or aroused "curiosityn (J.88 per cent). 
Many subjects complied for reasons classified 
as "altruistic", and these ranked fourth (equal) and 
totalled 10 per cent of the total reasons given. Typical 
of suc? a response was the following which is part of a 
transcript from a Phase III interview: 
"Just to .help you with your re search 11 • 
(S13, from group C). 
The most idiosyncratic are included in the 
Miscellaneous category. One subject commented: 
"I guess in a way I didn't believe these 
(headings), but I didn't admit them to myself". 
(S29, from group E). 
There were two types of reasons offered by 
trainee nurses who refused the task, at the start of 
Phase II; they either felt it was too much effort, or 
unethical. 
Discussion 
The main significance here is the low ranking 
of financial incentive, as a reason for compliance. 
Yet, the inverse relation of attitude change, to amount 
of incentive, is a keynote of both Dissonance and 
Incentive theories. 
123. 
Many studies assume that the reason for 
compliance is financial, without actually supporting such 
an assumption by the use of an appropriate experimental 
check. The role of financial incentive is discussed 
thoroughly in the major Discussion section, as the 
implicat_ions of the above-mentioned result are of some 
importance to the field. 
MRny s11hjP.r.t.s AlY'P.Rny fAlt. r.ommittP.rl to r.:=irryjng 
out whatever experimental task E presented, unless it was 
too demanding. They had already made their decision 
to comply before they entered the experimental setting 
for Phase II of the study ("Part of an experiment they had 
volunteered for"). 
This would tend to support Nuttin (1975), who 
suggested in his experimental findings, that the amount 
of incentive is purely incidental. Dissonance is aroused 
by other factors, other than some of the traditional ones 
Dissonance theorists claim (Nuttin, 1975, p. 92). 
Many of the other reasons offered appear 
preclusive of the financial one predicted by Dissonance 
theorists. "Altruistic reasons" is one such reason. 
124. 
Even if the non-financial reasons.were merely 
additional, and not preclusive, logically it would 
appear that these would also provide at least equal 
impact on the inducement process. Experimental support 




























Decision Time in Seconds for each Subject 
to Decide to Perform the Discrepant Task 
of Writing Counterattituclinal Assignments 
Subjects 
$5 A 2.0 14.2 1.0 0.8 1.0 2.6 
$3 B 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.8 2.0 65.0 
g;: $1 C 15.0 1.6 30. 6 5.2 0.8 29.8 
H r:r:i 
85.0 8 $5 ~ D 24.4 1.0 1.2 3.2 1.2 z <:i:: 
~ $3 z E 1.6 79.0 1.0 0 1.0 0.8 
z 
H $1 F 2.0 4.0 0 5.2 65.0 o. ,g 
rz.. $5 G 2.0 0 Cl · 1.4 1.0 0 
0 $3 P-, 3.0 5H 1 E-i 0.2 . o.6 0 0 0 
5 $1 g§ I 0 2.0 0 -0 0 0 
0 
~ $5 J 2.0 14.0 (l 0 0 0 
<:i:: 
$3 · K 1.0 0 0 0 o.6 o.6 
$1 L 0 0 0.5 0 0 1 
























Decision time with respect to Compliance or Refusal 
The difference between the Overall Choice mean 
(12.6 seconds) and the Overall No choice mean (0.8 seconds) 
is 11.8. This difference is statistically significant, 
using at test (Unre~ated measures)(t10 = 4.28, p < 0.005). 
This difference is reflected in the magnitudes of the 
group means, where all six Choice groups are greater 
than the No choice groups. The least clearly 
differentiated were the mean differences between 
group A (3.6 seconds) and group J (2.7 seconds). It is 
worth noting, that the group J mean is elevated by the 
atypically high value of one member subject. 
Discussion 
Decision time W8,s difficult to measure. It 
was difficult to ascertain at precisely what point 
a subject had reached a decision to comply. Responses 
tended not to be definitive. Often subjects would 
not verbally communicate their answer before asking 
additional questions about the task. It was sometimes 
difficult to determine whether this was pre-decisional 
or post-decisional clarification. Measurement was 
probably, therefore, cruder than the figures suggest, 
correrited to one decimal place. 
127. 
For this reason no further tests of significance 
have been attempted although inspection would suggest 
that most groui mean differences are of sufficient 
magnitude to attain statistical significance. 
A more serious difficulty was raised by the 
qualitative responses of subjects (see p.132). A 
number of subjects revealed that their decision had been 
made before they arrived for the decisional phase 
(Phase II). 
However, taking such reservations into account, 
timing the decision did provide an appropriate 
experimental check of perceived choice. It would 
appear that the manipulation of choice was reflected. 
to some extent, in the subject's latency in reaching 
a decision to comply. 
Persuasiveness of the Assignments 
To·recapitulate, in experimental Phase III, each_ 
experimental subject rated each of her three counter-
attitudinal assignments on a thirteen point scale, as to 
how persuasive she felt they were (seep. 78 ). 
After the names of the signed assignments were 
obliterated, the 216 assignments were completely 
randomised and independently presented to two associates 
of the writer. These people, Judge A and Judge B, used 
the same scale as did the subjects, to rate the 
persuasiveness of each assignment. 
128. 
For the purpose of assessing interjudge 
reliability, the original thirteen point scale was 
collapsed to a five point scale, which used the same 
labels. This action allowed comparison with 
Rosenberg's study (1965), as he used a five point scale. 
On page 78, the original scale is depicted, and it can 
be seen that the new scale, ranging from 1 (Not 
persuasive at all) to 5 (Completely or nearly completely 
persuasive), was readily derived. For. each 
assignment the subjective rating was compared with the 
mean of Judge A and Judge B's independent rating. 
The comparisons showed that 88.89 per cent of 
the low involvement assignment differential ratings 
were either identical or within one point of each other. 
1'.j\,,..."""' ..... t-._ --~..: .... ,,_ -""r1 1.-...: -1.... -t ...... ~ .. _, _ .. __ ,,,..._.._ ,... -- • ___ .., __ .a.._ .t-1......-
J."UJ. vuc; UlvU.J..U.111 Cl.HU ll.J.t,H .J..i1VU.J..VClllC:11V Cl.:>.:>.J.t,1llllv11Vu, Vll~ 
corresponding reliability figures were 84.72 per cent 
and 86.11 per cent respectively. The overall mean of 

















Experimental group me3.ns of each subject's ratings (SR) 
of Persuasiveness Co:nbined Judge ratings (JAB) and the 
Resultant Mean for Assignments of Low, Medium and High 
Involvement Respectively 
LO'W Inv. :GIBDIUM. Inv. 
SR JAB Mean SR JAB Mean SR 
2.167 2.167 2.167 2.333 2.500 2.417 2. 833 
2.333 2.667 2.500 2.333 3.167 2.750 2.167 
2.167 3.000 2.584 2.000 2.667 2.334 2.333 
2.667 3.167 2.917 2.500 3.167 2.$34 2.167 
2.000 2.833 2.417 2.667 · 3.167 2.917 2.500 
3.000 J.500 3.250 2.000 3.167 2.584 2.500 
2.667 2.500 2. 584 2.333 3.000 2.667 2.500 
2.667 2.667 2.667 2.333 2.667 2.500 2.500 
2.333 2.167 2.250 J.000 2. 833 2.917 J.000 
2.000 2.500 2.250 2.333 3.000 2.667 2.667 
2.667 3.000 2.834 2.667 2.833 2.750 2.500 
2.667 2.667 2.667 2.167 2.667 2.417 2.000 



































Table 15 used the modified figures, which 
resulted from the c6llapsing of the original 13 point 
scale to a five point one, as described in the previous 
paragraph. 
The two judges tended to rate the assignments 
at all three levels of Involvement, as more persuasive than 
did the subjects. Also if the levels of Involvement were 
disregarded, the overall subjective mean was 2.435, while 
the overall judge mean was 2.852~ However, none of these 
mean differences were of sufficient magnitude to attain 
statistical significance using a t-test (Related 
measures)(p > 0.05). 
With reference to the table, it is apparent 
that a direct relationship between increasing levels of 
Involvamant, and Persuasiveness exist. " -- - _! ·- ,_ - - - - - -J-1.~ct.Lu, HUWtlVtlr, 
none of the differences are significant (p > O. 05, · 
Related measures t-test). 
Examination of the within subject factors 
revealed no differential effects of note. The means for 
the Low ($1.00), Medium ($J.OO) and High ($5,00) 
Incentive subjects were similar, the ·values being 
2.674, 2.660 and 2.598 respectively, The differences 
were not statistically significant (p~ Oo05, Related 
measures t-test). 
The choice and no choice means were very 
similar, being 2.616 and 2.672 respectively. The 
difference between m~ans was not statistically 
significant (p > 0.05, related measures t-test). 
131. 
The relative·publicity and anonymous subject means 
were 2.593 and 2.695 respectively, and the difference 
was not statistically significant (p > 0.05, related 
measures t-test). 
Discussion 
The collapsing of the original thirteen point 
scale of persuasiveness, to a five point one, allowed a 
comparison of this study's interjudge reliability 
figure with that of Rosenberg (1965). The latter study 
found that 80 per cent of two judge's ratings of 
persuasiveness were either identical or within one point 
of a five point scale. 
Therefore, in terms of interjudge reliability, 
·the present study compared very favourably with that of 
Rosenberg (1965). The present study was more . 
comprehensive, in that the individual subject's ratings 
of their own assignments was taken into account. 
With regard to the persuasive data per se, 
little can be said of an interpretative nature, without 
caution, as differences did not attain statistical 
significance, and the following comments are made with 
this ~ajor reservation in mind. 
132. 
The subjects consistent tendency to rate their 
assignments as less persuasive than did the two judges, 
may represent a self-effacement effect. It is noted 
that the subjective ratings are consistently closest 
to 2 ("slightly persuasive") while the two judges 
consistently rate the same assignments closest to the 
integer 3 ("moderately persuasive"). 
The direct relationship between Involvement 
and Persuasiveness, possibly results from a greater 
facility to remember oppositional ideas of issues that 
are more important to the subject. 
The means of the between subjects are almost 
remarkable by their being virtually identical and no 
further interpretative comment will be offered. 
Qualitative data 
This section refers to the verbal responses 
of subjects to questions posed during the tape-recorded 
interview of experimental Phase III. 
The questions relating to experimental checks 
are dealt with, not here, but in the final part of the 
Results (see p.140). 
The answers to questions and other general 
comments were not intended for numerical analysis, but 
merely to provide some idea of the subjects' reactions 
to the study. However, for economy of presentation, some 
numerical treatment is inescapable. 
The questions asked are reproduced here, 
verbatim, prior to presentation of the responses. 
133. 
QJ "How would you feel towards doing another experiment 
like this one, if ever you were asked?" . 
The overwhelming reaction to this question was· 
a willingness to participate in a study of a similar 
type (92.Ilper cent). The figure was slightly higher 
for the experimental (92.85 per cent) than the control 
subjects (SJ.33 per cent). 
No clear trends emerged, if the between subject 
factors were examined. Slightly more of the choice 
(94.28 per cent) than the no choice (91.43 per cent) 
subjects would again participate. Less of the high ($5.00) 
incentive subjects would again participate (86.36 per cent) 
than those of the two lower levels (95.83 per cent). 
There was virtually no difference between the 
public (94.60 per cent) and the anonymous (91.43 per cent) 
subjects. 
Of the subjects who felt they would be 
unwilling to do a similar experiment, all except one, 
cited the reason of time loss. They felt that the study 
had consumed too much of their time. The exceptional 
subject claimed the counterattitudinal nature of the 
experimental task, as her reason. 
Some of the subjects who would again 
participate, qualified their response. The most 
frequent comment here was that they would like to 
134. 
know more about the nature of the experiment beforehand. 
One subject volunteered that the class had "gone to the 
extremes of confidentiality". 
Q9 "If your best friend knew you had written assignments 
opposite to your own views, what would she think of 
you?" 
To this question, some subjects gave more than 
one reply, the additional ones after reflection, and all 
were noted. There were 73 responses in total. 
The majority considered that there would be 
"no change" in their friends attitude towards them 
(63.01 per cent), although 19.18 per cent of these added 
the qualifying comment "if they knew it was for an 
experiment•~nd the like. 
Some subjects (17.81 per cent) simply had no 
idea, as to their friends reactions. 
Some subjects (9.59 per cent) said their 
friends would "wonder why" they had complied. 
A minority said that their friends would react 
in a negative way (8.22 per cent). They would be 
considered unethical or 'stupid'. 
Finally, one respondent (1.37 per cent) 
commented that her friend would consider she had 
changed her views. 
Qll "How pleasant did you find the writing of the 
assignments?" 
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The majority of responses could be included 
under the heading Unpleasant (42.86 per cent). The 
next category included responses that indicated that the 
task was considered neutral (J0.00 per cent), neither 
pleasant or unpleasant. Only a minority of subjects 
considered the task to be relatively pleasant (27.14 per 
cent). 
Of the subjects who found the task unpleasant, 
most could specify what it was that caused their 
negative feelings. Most frequent additional comment 
here related to the counterattitudinal nature of the 
task (43.33 per cent). Other responses suggested it 
was the writing per se, that was unpleasant (16.67 per 
cent). Some found the task boring (10 per cent), 
frustrating (6.66 per cent) or embarrassing (3.33 per cent). 
Some subjects found the sheer effort of thinking up 
the arguments unpleasant (23.33 per cent), 
Ql2 "How much did you hesitate before agreeing to write 
the assignments?" 
There was a reasonably high degree of awareness 
among the experimental subjects, as to how long they had 
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hesitated before deciding to comply. The responses 
could be divided into those who claimed they paused for 
a short time (0- 10 seconds), and those whc paused for a 
long time (10.2 seconds or longer). To ~nsure that E's 
and each subjects concept of both terms was similar, 
the latter were invited to numerically describe their 
pause. It was found that 85.50 per cent of the 
subjects responses were in accordance with the limits defined 
by the two terms. 
Although not incorporated into Ql2, some of the 
subjects (n=6) volunteered that they had already made 
their decision to comply, prior to entering experimental 
room 1, for Phase II. 
The handful of subjects who accurately 
indicated their perceived pause duration, were not 
distributed in any pattern such as would permit comment 
in terms of the between subject factors. 
Ql3 "If you were asked to defend what you have written in 
the assignments to some nurses in a couple of months 
time, how would you feel about that?" If necessary 
E posed the additional question: 
0 Do you think you would be willing to do that?" 
Slightly more subjects indicated they would 
accede to such a request (53.62 per cent) than refuse 
(46.38 per cent). 
The subjects who indicated that they would 
decline such a request, gave a diversity of reasons. 
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Most claimed the task would be quite unpleasant (11.59 per 
cent). Others said the counterattitudinal nature of 
the hypothetical request would be the reason (5.79 per 
cent). Other reasons included ethics (5.79 per cent), 
fear of public speaking (li,.J5 per cent), weakness of 
their assignment points (4.J5 per cent), fear (2.90 per 
cent), and the pointless nature of such an exercise 
(1.45 per cent). 
Ql4 11Is there anything else you would particularly like 
to say about this study?" 
Of subjects who did comment affirmatively, the 
overwhelmingly dominant response indicated curiosity as 
to the exact purpose and nature of the study (47.83 per 
cent). Many simply replied negatively in response to 
the question (27.54 per cent). 
All other responses accounted for minute 
proportions of total responses. Some subjects found 
some of the questionnaire items "irrelevant'' (4. J 5 per 
cent). Some subjects indicated that the experiment 
had been a worthwhile experience for them personally 
(8.70 per cent). 'There were various other responses, 
each accounting for only one subject. 
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Discussion 
This part of the procedure was worthwhile 
in allowing subjects to express their reactions to the 
study. However, the responses should be considered 
generally - and not too specifically. It would be 
noted that a couple of subjects difference could somewhat 
artifically represent a large-appearing percentage 
difference~ 
It is of interest, that despite the general 
reaction that the task was unpleasant, most of the 
subjects would participate in a similar study, if asked. 
Subjects appeared to treat the study seriously, 
rather than casually. This was partly reflected in 
their accurate judgement of how long they hesitated prior 
to complying as well as their keenness to know what 
the study was all about. 
The question concerning their best friends 
reaction, could have been phrased better, as most 
responses were in need of qualification. Obviously, 
the fact that an experiment was the cause of their 
action, was crucial. Despite this, most anticipated no 
change in their friends prior attitude towards them. 
The fact that the majority would not be 
prepared to defend their assignments to their peers, 
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does underline the difference between relative publicness 
and anonymity. It also highlights the relative 
nature of these terms. Preswnably, the willingness 
to defend the assignments to "an assistant of mine 11 
(public condition) is viewed as more anonymous than the 
act of exposing themselves to their peers. 
11+0. 
THE EXPERIMENTAL CHECKS 
The success of the manipulation of choice· 
Table 16 is based purely-on subject ratings, 
on a thirteen point scale of how much choice they felt 
they were given as to whether or not they complied 
(seep. 77 for a diagram of the scale). The highest 
ratings represented the highest perceived subjective 
choice. 
The difference between the overall mean for 
all choice groups (9.306) and that for all no choice 
groups (4.667) was statistically significant 
(t10:::: 5.047, pc::: 0.005). This difference is even 
greater if the most atypical result of each group is 
pa.rtie..lled out. (The me~ns ~re then, 
10.400 and 3.833). 
Examination of the individual group means 
demonstrates that all six choice values are of greater 
magnitude than those of the no choice groups, which is 
satisfactory •. The poorest results are the means from 
group D and group K, because they differentiate least 
clearly on the choice-no choice continuum. 
Although all group means were correctly ordered, 
not all differences attained statistical significance. 
In fact, if the means are ordered from highest to lowest, 
only the highest and lowest values are sufficiently 
different from each other to reach statistical significance. 
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TABLE 16 
The success of the choice manipulation 
as reflected by Group and Overall mean 
subJects ratings 
A 12 7 13 13 13 13 
B 10 1 10 6 10 12 
C 10 13 12 11 5 7 
D 6 13 6 13 5 1 
E 8 7 13 13 7 13 
F 10 13 13 7 7 2 
5 1 6 4 1 5 
H 1 1 13 7 9 3 
I 11 6 8 2 1 8 
J 7 1 6 3 5 3 
K 6 1 13 10 5 2 
L 2 1 3 3 3 2 























Significance table of m differences 














Key: S**** = Significant at =005 level of conftrlAncR 
ns = not significant (.05level) 
If, however, the most atypical result is 
removed from each group, all mean differences of the 
above pairings attain statistical significance at the 
0.05 level of confidence, with the exception of the 
first. With this modification, the groups are ordered 
as follows: 
TABLE 18 
SiGnificance table for differences 
be~ween ,rou means for choice rat1n s 
wit atypica resu ts ce ete 
Group M_ean (modified 
A 12. 800 · 




D 8.600 j * * * * * {f) * * * * * ~ * * * * * 




G 3 .200 
L 2.200 
lltJ. 
Key: S**** = Significmt at • 005 level of confidence 
ns = Not significant (.05 level) 
Note that with this modification, gro~ps I and 
K assume each others former position. 
Responses could be viewed in terms of typical, 
atypical and marginal responses. Typical choice results 
were within 8-13 limits, typical no choice responses 
within 1-6. The intermediary value (7) defined 
marginal responses. Viewed in this manner, the following 
table can be constructed: 
TABLE 19 
Typical, Marginal and Atypical 
Choice Ratings 
,Typical Marginal 
Choice 22 6 
No choice 27 2 
Overall 49 8 






The majority of responses were therefore in 
the typical range, although a sizeable minority were 
atypical. 
Discussion 
The results show a reasonably successful 
manipulation of choice, as reflectedby the subjects 
rating of this variable. 
clearly illustrates this. 
The overall mean difference 
The main significance of the group means is 
in the fact they are correctly ordered. Some of the 
mean differences between the choice groups and the no 
choice groups did not attain statistical significance, 
but two explanations could account for this. 
Firstly, the scale was a fairly narrow one, 
with only thirteen possible response options. This 
means that even clearly psychologically differentiated 
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responses may not necessarily be of sufficient 
numerical difference to attain statistical significance. 
For example, th~ difference between a response of 
g (clearly ~·choice rating) and one of 6 (clearly a 
no choice rating) may still not be statistically 
significant. 
The solution to this difficulty probably 
involves incorporating a larger number of choices 
between the extremes on the choice-no choice continuum. 
Secondly, atypical choice ratings adversely 
influenced the typical ratings (which accounted for 
most responses). Even given the narrowness of the 
scale modification of the group means to exclude the 
most atypical results, markedly improved the different-
iation between choice and no choice. 
The remaining experimental checks catised a 
number of unsatisfactory results to come to light. 
Such subjects' results were eliminated, and are 
shown in Table 20, together with the reasons for this 
action. 
A total of fifteen results were excluded from 
analysis, which means that 93 subjects completed. 
Phase II of the experiment. Therefore, 78 results 
were included in analysis, which represents 83.87 per 
cent of the total. 
TABLE 20 
Results that were Eliminated 
Tram ana)ysis, including the 
reasons for this action -
Grouns 
Reasons T A B C D E F 
Absenteeism 4 1 
Misunderstood ~- 1 1 1 
Misread statements 1 ,/ 
Semantic problems 1 1 
Disbelieved public 1 1 
defence 
Atypical of subject 1 1 
criteria 
Experimenter's mis- 1 
take 
T = Total 
G H I J K 
1 
1 1 
Some subjects did not coraplete the study, in 
that they did not return for experimental Phase III. 
Thus, it was not possible to analyze their (partial) 




Absenteeism. The reasons included illness, departure from 
Christchurch and simple refusal to return. 
The absentee subjects were not eliminated as a 
result of an experimental check, but it is convenient 
to discuss them in this section. The same comment can be 
made as regards the one result eliminated, because of the 
experimenter's mistake. 
Because this particular subject arrived earlier 
than expected, she was given another's headed assignment 




but the subject was allowed to proceed through the 
experiment, to avoid any dissatisfaction with a rapid 
ending to her participation. 
ll~ 7. 
One subject's results were eliminated, because 
she was considered atypical of her experimental peers in 
that she was middle-aged, i.e. outside the age range of 
the other subjects. 
The remaining nine subject's results were 
eliminated as a consequence of experimental checks. Four 
of these subjects misunderstood the counterattitudinal 
nature of the task, and proceeded to write their views 
regardless of the headings. These subjects revealed 
their error in Phase III, when the appropr .i.at,e question 
was asked in order to check that they realised the 
counterattitudinal nature of the task. 
Three subjects misread the relevant statement 
in the Phase I booklet twice, both in the Involvement 
and the Attitude questionnaire (thus overcoming the 
safeguard built into the selection of the three issues 
of checking the Involvement response (second column) 
with that of the Attitude questionnaire). Effectively, 
on the misread item, E had inadvertently phrased the 
heading in such a way that it agreed with the subject's 
viewpoint. 
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The validity question posed in Phase III also 
unearthed another subject who was also writing an 
assignment consonant with her personal views (semantic 
problems). This particular subject was not certain 
of the meaning of the word "nationalization", when 
she first did the questionnaire booklet, during 
experimental Phase I. Prior to arriving for experimental 
Phase II, she looked up the meaning of the ~ord, which 
was different from her original conception. 
An excellent high level of E's credibility 
held, as regards whether or not subjects' believed they 
would either have their assignments anonymity respected 
or whether they would be required to publicly defend 
their argtm1ents. One subject, however, did not believe 
she would have to give a public defence, and therefore 
effectively, the task was cognitively less public than 
for the other public subjects. She said: "No, (I 
didn't believe you) (Why?), I don't know, I just didn't. 
You said all the way through that you ·were doing it for 
yourself as a thesis, so I don~t think anyone would be 
doing it with you". 
The final two experimental checks did not 
yield any eliminations. With respect to the "limited 
period" secrecy request, there were some minor 
infringements,although most subjects took the request 
quite seriously. The aspect least strictly adhered to 
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was the relative amounts of money. No subject appeared 
to have had prior expectation concerning what was about 
to take place, as r8gards experimental Phase II or III. 
Examination of the interviews of subjects who 
admitted speaking to other subjects, revealed no instances 
of deception. 
Recently, since the study ended, feedback was 
received from a member of the technical trainee nurse 
class, and this indicated that the secrecy request was 
taken seriously. 
The appropriate question asked by E, in 
experimental Pha.se III demonstrated that no one even 
approached successfully working out the purpose of the study. 
Discussion 
The number of results that had to be eliminated 
provides its own justification for stringent experimenta_l 
checks. Earlier studies, like that of Festinger and 
Carlsmith (1959), did not report on the subject. Yet, it 
would appear unlikely that no results had to be discarded 
when one considers studies that do report, in detail, on 
this aspect. Frey and Irle (1972) for example, report in 
detailed form on the 12 subjects (7.60 per cent), whose 
results were excluded from analysis. 
150. · 
The current study presented eliminations in a 
more detailed form than most studies. The proportion 
(17.24 per cent) is higher than in most other studies, 




The results are not supportive of Dissonance theory, either 
in general fonn, or the differential form suggested by Frey and Irle 
(1972). However, the results also do not support the alternative -
Incentive theory. The best that can be said, is that any theoretical 
explanation must take more into account than the few factors that most 
investigators (not just Frey and Irle) suggest as a complete explanation 
of attitude change behaviour. 
The current study introduced just one additional factor; 
numerous others could have been either additional or substitutional. 
was by no means a new one. Himmelfarb and Arazi (1974), for example, 
incorporated this into their study, One member of the Dissonance 
school~ namely Cohen, recognized the importance of this variable, by 
suggesting that higher degrees of Involvement, yielded more dissonance 
and consequent attitude change if subjects performed counterattitudinally. 
(Cohen 1959). The results of the current study did not support Cohen's 
predicition, but the point is that Dissonance theory does have something 
to say about Involvement, despite being overlooked by Frey and Irle. 
Frey and Irle chose to overlook not only this variable, but 
the many others considered to be important by Dissonance theorists, in 
detennining the magnitude of dissonance. 
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Some of these were discussed in the Introduction section, and included 
Effort (Arrowood and Wood, 1970), Connnibnent (Linder and Worchel, 1970), 
Source attractive::iess (Zimbardo et al 1965) and so on. It is enigmatic 
that Frey and Irle should overlook relevant previous research to concern~ 
trate on just three (Amount of Public exposure, Choice and Incentive) 
thus inviting the criticism of 'simplicity'. At this point, the 
discussion will examine the evidence of Experimental bias as it may 
have relevance to Frey and Irle's finding, as well as others which 
are usually supportive of their investigator's experimental viewpoint. 
A cynic may observe that when an investigator replicates a study, 
his published results always are 'supportive' of his own theory. Thus, 
Festinger, Brehem and Cohen et al usually obtain Inverse relationships 
between financial incentives and aUltuJe change. Incentive theorists, 
such as Elms and Janis (1965), usually obtain the Incentive effect. 
Is there any advantage in investigating attitude change, 
using researchers from both the Incentive and the Dissonance theoretical 
schools? Carlsmith, Collins and Helmreich (1966) was one such study, 
that did. Not surprisingly, in their study involving either face~to~ 
face role playing or anonymous essay writing, each of a discrepant nature, 
their results were the same 'compromise! as those of Frey and Irle's. 
It should be noted that the Experimenter in the current 
study, had no real preconceptions with respect to the two theories, prior 
to carrying out the procedure. It is true that the results confinned 
the hypothesis concerning the equal importance of another variable, 
tl-ian those Frey and Irle considered cn1cial (hypothesis 1). Frey and 
and Irle's distinctions were not upheld which lead to the rejection 
of Hypothesis 2. 
When the topic of Experimental bias is raised, many 
investigators are reluctant to deal with it directly, in an attempt 
to establish how it operates. There is a tendency to be evasive, 
and treat it as abstract - something that cannot be 'pinned' down. 
It is quite tnie, that comments about some aspects of this 
. influence can only be speculative. However, this writer believes that 
some degree of careful speculation is better than treating the issue as 
mysterious and unfath.omable. 
However, careful examination of some published results, does . 
reveal some degree of 'observable' Experimental bias. 
TI1e writer will addres.s himself to both •':cautious speculation 1 
as well as 'observable' examples of Experimental bias, in an attempt 
to explain why so many 'predictable' .results are part of the attitude 
change literature. 
In the current study, it can be said that the Fxperimenter 
had no reputation to uphold. He could not find himself in the dilemma 
of producing results, which were not consistent with those on which 
a reputation was based. It would appear quite possible that partisan 
theorists consistently publish their 'supportive' results; Results that 
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are not confirmative of their theories· are sin1ply not published. 
Nuttin (1975) raised an even more pernicious possibility, 
in this context. Addressing himself critically to a study by Cohen 
(In Brehm and Cohen, 1962, P73 - 78), he comments:-
"The very fact that no reasons were offerred (for the 
inequality of subject numbers across conditions) makes 
it difficult, however, to defend the author when he is 
accused of stopping data gathering as soon as the results 
confirmed the predictions" 
P. 4 Nuttin (1975) 
The current study, of course, also eliminated some results from 
analysis. However, the reasons for such action were clearly spelled 
out and in line with specific experimental checks. Also, there was 
equality of subject numbers in each group> unlike Cohen's study. 
If the above is in the realm of 'speculation' , that which is 
actually 'observable' is somewhat disquietening, 
A further example is the tendency among some investigators to 
draw conclusions from insufficent data in an almost desperate 
attempt to confinn their particular theoretical viewpoint. Elms 
and Janis (1965) obtained only one result (of 10) that was statistically 
significant. On this hardly robust foundation, they described their 
results as supportive of Incentive theory. 
Rosenberg's (1965) study furnishes a second example of bias. 
Rosenberg claimed that Cohen's Inverse effect (Cohen 1962) is due 
purely to 'contaminants' such as the delaying of the payment of the 
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reward as well as a lack of 'perceptual separation' of attitude 
measurement and the counterattitudinal act. However, he was faced 
with the embarrassment of Festing=rand Cohen (1959)'s results, 
which also obtain the same effect as Cohen, without the two 
'contaminants'. Accordingly, Rosenberg claimed that Festinger and 
Cohen's 'perceptual separation' was insufficent, in that they did 
not disguise the attitude measurement and counterattitudinal phases, 
Specifically, Rosenberg claims that the two phases should have been 
held in different university departments. Yet, according to Nuttin 
(1975), Festinger_ and Cohen went to considerate lengths to successfully 
ensure adequate 'perceptual separation', and that separate university 
departments was not essential. Furthermore, the payment of the reward 
before the counterattitudinal role playing, involved less risk of 
resertrch contaimination than Rosenberg's payment immediately after. 
Nuttin refers to Rosenberg's wishful interpretation of Festinger 
and Carlsmith's experimentmildlyas 'rather subjective',which emphas-
izes the writer's point. 
Setting aside the issue of Experin1enter bias, when the 
quality of the past research relating to Dissonance theory is examined, 
some unfortunate patterns are apparent. Even a study as relatively 
limited in scope as the current one, highlighted some of the inadequacies 
of past research. 
One unfortunate feature is the lack of conciseness in the 
usage of Dissonance theory terminology by researchers. Much of the 
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blame can be laid at the feet of Festinger and the Dissonance 
theorists ambiguous and unclear expression of concepts. 
The results of the theoretical 'looseness' has been too 
much latitude in the exact operational meanings of Dissonance theory 
concepts. Zimbardo and Ebbesen (1969) for example, concur with this 
criticism. This 'looseness' of usage is a probable explanation for some 
of the contra<lictory interpretations of research results. 
One example of this, is the interchangeable use of such 
words as 'reward' and financial 'Incentive' . 1 Thus, one researcher 
such as Rosenberg (1965) will use the former term while others, such 
as Cooper et al (1972) use the latter. The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
defines the two ,vords as follows: -
reward "Return or recompense for service or merit, requital 
for good or evil" 
incentive "Incitement (to action, to do, to doing), provocation, 
motive''. 
Thus, the words are only similar, and definitely not synon,. 
)'lnous. Thus, when the Dissonance theorists, who tend to use the word 
'reward', and the Incentive theorists, who tend to use 'Incentive', 
actually disaeree, they are not strictly in agreement about the same 
term. 
1 There are other terms used, synon)'lnously, such as 'compensation' 
(Bern 1967) and 'inducement'. 
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Examination of the critical reviews of Dissonance theory, 
including Chapanis and Chapanis 1964, most frequently cite the 
imprecision of the theory. Ambiguity is another word. often used 
(Zimbardo and Ebbesen 1969). There is no shortage of examples of 
what such theorists are referring to. 
Frey and Irle, of course, have argued that a high degree of 
Choice, as well as a Public counterattitudenal task, were the finite 
preconditions. 
Yet Festinger's original formulation predicted dissonance, 
and attitude change for Anonymous counterattitudenal behaviour, 
although admittedly less then for the Public condition. Frey and Irle 
predicted no effect for Anonymous conditions, whatsover. 
It appears illogical that Frey and Irle present Public exposure 
as a Precondition, while its converse, Anonymity is a factor favouring 
Magnitude of dissonance. 
Kumpf and Gtltz- Marchand (1973) argue that the original for,-. 
mulation of Dissonance theory did not clearly deal with Modes of 
dissonance reduction. From the Introduction section, it will be 
remembered that these included adding con~Dnant elements, increasing 
cognitive overlap, selective attention and so on. However, no clear 
rules are laid out to d~nonstrate the quantitative relation of such 
modes to each other, or to a'.ttitude 1.change. The type of exact relation~ 
/ 
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ships are left purely to the intuition of the reader. 
There are many other examples, which will not be gone into 
in the interests of brevity. The point is, that ambiguous, imprecise 
theoretical concepts prepare the way for too much latitude in the 
interpretative meaning of such concepts, or worse, in the words o'f 
Zimbardo and Ebbesen (1969), incorrect translation into specific ·: 
experimental operations. 
The likely corollary, as mentioned, is contradictory results 
often even from intended replications. For example,note Rosenberg (1965) 
's replication of Cohen (1962). 
A-riothcr 11.....-rifortunatc feature of past research in the f icld, 
is the number of assumptions made, without sufficient and adequate 
backing. Perhaps the most serious example of this is the assumed role 
of the different amount; of financial incentive. Specifically ,it is 
assumed that the reason for subjective compliance is monetary. The 
current study did not make this assumption but provided an experiment-
al check. 
It is worth commenting on Festinger's original formulation 
of the role of money. The minimum level of remuneration was described 
as a '1r1inimal force for compli:ance" or just enough to .elicit the overt 
compliance. (P. 75, Festinger, 1957). 
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Yet, many studies do not inco:,iporate an appropriate 
experimental check, to ensure that the reason for compliance was, 
in fact, monetary. 
One possibility, which was used in the current study, is to ask 
the subjects exactly why they complied. In the pooled responses to 
this question in this study, monetary reasons for compliance ranked 
a poor ninth in order of frequency. 
Some investigators have provided reasons as to why they do 
not directly ask such questions. Rosenberg (1965) for example, felt 
that such a procedure may be experimental 'contaminant' . He may or 
may not be correct, but he does not provide an alternative 'non-
contaminating' check as to the specific reasons for compliance. 
Dissonance theorists are equally guilty of making the same unsupport-
ed monetary assumption. Cohen (1962), is one such example. 
The writer considers such an unsupported assumption 
unwarranted. He considers it imperative that some type of check is 
incorporated to provide empirical support for the monetary assumption, 
Another means of assessing the role of money, which would 
not provide 'contamination' (Rosenberg's expression) would be to have a 
zero reward counterattitudinal condition. Luckily, one investigator did 
design such a study. Nuttin (1975, P83 - 96) included a condition where 
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subjects delivered a counterattitudinal plea, supposedly for a radio 
broadcast. Firstly, subjects complied in this condition in approx-
imately equal numbers as for the rewarded conditions. Clearly, as 
none of those people complied for monetary reasons, they must have complied 
for other, non-monetary reasons. In addition, if a person complied 
without financial justification, he would experience the most dissonance 
and concomitant attitude change, according to Dissonance theory 
predictions .. The results, however, did not support such a conclusion. 
In fact, the low reward (20BF) 2condition yielded significantly more 
attitude char,ge. The zero reward condition yielded virtually identical 
attitude change, as the high reward (200BF) 3 condition. Thus, on two 
counts, results from a zero reward condition cause difficulties for 
the assumption that compliance is for monetary reasons, which, at 
the smallest reward level is the "Minimal force for compliance". 
Dissonance theory is criticised directly because it is at its 
most vulnerable here. However, the writer hastens to add, that any 
unsupported assumption, that the reason for compliance is financial, 
is unwarranted. By implication, some Incentive theorists are guilty 
of the same flaw. Janis and Gilmore (1965), for example, do not check 
their assumption, before arriving at a conclusion supportive of 
Incentive theory. 
2Z0BF or twenty Belgian Francs is the equivalent of US $0.40 
3200BF or two hundred Belgian Fracs is the equivalent of US $4.00 
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Interestingly enough, apart from the infrequency of monetary 
gain being cited as a reason for compliance in the current study, for 
some subjects the money was actually a disincentive. Several subjects 
said they were not very keen about accepting money, although were 
quite willing to comply. 
This raises the question of exactly why subjects did comply, 
assuming that the results of the current study, as well as those of 
Nuttin's study are valid. 
The most frequently cited reason for compliance was the comment 
that it was simply "Part of an experiment they had volunteered for". 
It seems likely that many subjects in attitude change 
experiments view their actions simply as being part of the research, 
rather than as a discrepant act per se. 
However, another possible reason arises from the nature of 
most of the subject pools used. Specifically, as noted in the Subjects 
section, much of the research has used university students. Much of the 
dissonance research could be confounded by the possibility that the 
major reason for compliance is a desire to appease the lecturer, to 
avoid giving a negative impression, or worse still, as a partial require~ 
ment of the university course concerned .. 
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Some studies report on procedures, which incorporate 
non-monetary pleas for cooperation with E. Inadvertently, the impact 
of the financial incentive is reduced as a consequence of E's anxiety 
to elicit the subject's compliance. For such studies, such conditions 
should more accurately be called "Financial incentive and Experimenter 
plea". 
Even such scrupulously designed studies as Nuttin's replication 
of Rosenberg (1965), introduce this extraneous variable. (1975 P23-37). 
As part of the 'perceptual separation', the seond Experimenter says:-
"I myself am lucky when I find two or three volunteers a day. And 
that's how I have to prepare my PhD thesis". 
And he continues:-
110£ course, I do not want to force you to write the essay~ but vou 
certainly would do me a favour". · 
Intuitively, it seems unlikely that the trivial reward which is 
as little as S BF ($USO.IO) is the real reason for compliance. The 
reason could possibly be, a feeling of sympathy for EZ, who is unable 
to obtain many subjects. 
The current study was unlikely to be confounded by the need 
for subjects to appease E, as he was in no way associated with either 
nursing practical or theoretical training. In addition, the standard-
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ized procedural instructions for Phase II, did not include any such 
extraneous extra-monetary plea. 
Another unsupported assumption relates to the real value of 
the money offered as a financial incentive. Too little attention is 
paid as to whether or not the amounts offered have very much personal 
value for the subjects concerned. Often the amounts are very small -
as little as $0.05 and $0.50 (Lependorf 1964) - without any experimental 
check as to whether the subjects consider these to be of significant 
value to them. The research often refers to High and Low amounts of 
Incentive and supposedly differential results, overlooking the fact 
that one studies High, is less than another's Low. The current study's 
Low incentive value for instance, was higher than Lependorf's High value 
($0.50). This is important, when it is remembered that most studies do 
not provide for any relative awareness of other subjects incentives. 
Seemingly overlooked, is the fact that the financial status of 
subjects may affect the personal real value of the incentive. Obviously, 
a $5.00 incentive's real value will be greater for a poor person than for 
someone who is relatively wealthy. 
In the selection of subjects, for the current study,some 
effort was made to select subjects of a reasonable degree of homogeneous 
financial status. However, there is probably room for even more 
stringency. Possibly, a post-experimental check could ensure that no 
subject is markedly different from the rest, as regards financial status. 
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111e current study highlighted the inadequacy of providing 
only two levels of financial incentive. TI1e results, in many instances, 
revealed a markedly different pattern if all three levels were considered, 
(rather than just two). The implications for much of the research are 
serious, as most studies provide only two levels of incentive (Brehm 
and Cohen 1962) were a welcome exception, with their use of four levels 
of incentive; (0.50, $1.00, $5.00 and $10.00) 
However, even the use of three levels is a bare minimum, and 
probably more are required before researchers can profound theories 
involving linear or possibly curvilinear relationships. Yet, both the 
Dissonance and the Incentive schools have used research often with only 
two levels of incentive, to make their respective linear predictions. 
Another example of unsubstantiated assumptions, is the chain 
of causal elements proposed by Dissonance theory. This chain can be 
summarized as follows:-
Counterattitudinal behaviour • Cognitive dissonance • Attitude change 
Neither the links, nor the elements, have been stringently tested. 
Dissonance theorists make the mistake of assuming that obtaining the 
predicted inverse relationship between amount of financial incentive and 
attitude change, provides proof of the entire theory. 
One component of the chain, specifically the role of the 
converse of Co1mterattitudinal behaviour, i.e. Pro-attitudinal behaviour, 
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has been largely ignored by the Dissonance theorists. 
Yet the research that has provided· for the examination of 
Pro-attitudinal behaviour, has cast considerable doubt on the first 
component of the theoretical chain. Nuttin (1975, P83-96), found that 
there was little difference iri attitude change, whether advocacy was of 
a Pro-attitudinal or a Counterattitudinal nature.· In another experiment, 
there was slightly more attitude change for Pro-attitudinal advocacy 
then its converse; this was for the high incentive level (500BF) _, 
(Nuttin 1975, P43-49), 
This brings the discussion to the related topic of the inad-
equacy of Controls of much research. Often these pseudo-controls are 
experiinental Controls in nan1e only. Frey and Irle (1972) for example, 
make the lame comment that the: 
"Control condition is presented only as an estimate of student opinion 
on the issue" (Frey and Irle 1975, P49) 
This comment was included only as a footnote, and as no mention of 
Controls was made in their Procedure section, it would seem that it was 
purely an afterthought. An adequate Control should include such aspects as 
a Zero incentive level for Counterattitudinal behaviours, and, Pro-att-
itudinal behaviour at different levels of incentive. 
In support of these above comments, are Nuttin's remarks:-
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" .••• , we have always regretted the absence of a pro-attitudinal 
advocacy control condition in the relevant literature" 
(Nuttin 1972 P85) 
The current study did provide a Control group, which was a 
greater adequacy than those described in much of the earlier research 
on which so much stress has been placed. However, even this could have 
been considerably improved to include several levels of incentive, 
including zero, and a Pro-attitudinal task. There was, however,some 
constriction by the many combinations of variables, which necessitated 
13 groups. 
In the Introduction section, two ·general types of criticism 
were noted. Firstly, the same result-as that predicted by the Dissonance 
school occured, but an alternative theoretical explanation was offered.: •. 
Secondly, both a different result occurred and a alternate theoretical 
explanation was offered. The correct prediction of a result, as noted 
(i.e. Either Incentive effect or Dissonance effect) does not mean the 
confinnation of the theory. Here, both Dissonance and Incentive theorists 
are at fault. Neither does valid criticism of one theory, together with 
presentation of an alternative theory, provide confinnation of the latter; 
Rosenberg's theory of Evaluation Apprehension provides an example of 
misconception. Dissonance theory has been found wanting, but none of the 
oppositional theories have provided an comprehensively detailed alternative, 
which successfully accounts for both predicted results and theoretical 
explanation of same. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUM.1ARY AND CONCLUSION 
The study examined the pTopositions of Frey and Irle (1972) 
who suggested a compromise to the contrasting results predicted by the 
Dissonance and Incentive theorists • 
. Specifically, tmder Choice/Public conditions, Frey and Irle 
predicted an Inverse relationship between amotmt of financial incentive 
and attitude change. Alternatively, under .No choice/Anonymous conditions, 
they predicted a Direct relationship. The Inverse relationship was 
consistent with Dissonance theory predictions, whil~ the Direct relation-
ship was consistent with Incentive theory predictions. Thus, both 
theoretical explanations were accorrnnodated, under the specific conducive 
to each one. 
Dissonance theory itself included more than the three variables 
(Choice, Relative Publicity and Incentive) in its explanation of attitude 
change. The writer felt that Frey and Irle were being overly simplistic 
in considering only these factors as definitive, in their explanation 
of the complex human behvaiour involved in attitude formation or change. 
Therefore, an additional factor, personal Involvement in the 
task, was added to these other three, to form the basis of the study. 
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It was hypothesized that the effect of Involvement would be at least 
equal, to the other three Frey and Irle considered crucial. 
Additionally, it was hypothesized that the compromise predictions of 
these investigators, would not be confirmed when the additional factor 
was considered. 
There were three experimental phases, which involved over 
78 trainee nurses who served as subjects. 
During experimental Phase I, a group of subjectscompleted a 
booklet, including an Involvement and an Attitude questionnaire. From this, 
an issue of High, Low and Medium Involvement was chosen for each subject. 
Subjects were randomly assigned tc eith8Y c::1c of the 12 
Experimental, or the one Control group:. Sufficient candidates were used to 
ensure 6 subjects per group, after the elimination of unsatisfactory 
results. 
The groups were dictated by all ccmbinations of the three 
Between group factors, namely Choice, Relative publicity and Incentive 
assignment. 
wring Phase II, each Experimental subject was requested to 
undertake the same task, namely writing an counterattitudinal assignment 
on each of the issues of High, Medium and Low Involvement. The Control 
subjects merely filled in the same questionnaire booklet. In accordance 
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with the particular Experimental group, Choice was either emphasized 
or minimized, the Relative Publicity of their task was either emphasized 
or minimized, and there were three levels of financial Incentive offered 
~l.OO, $3.00 or $5.00). After the writing task, each Experimental 
subject completed the same questionnaire booklet, to gauge any immediate 
attitude. change. 
Phase III followed Phase II, after an average of five days 
lapse. All subjects completed the booklet for a third time to allow 
examination of the temporal stability of attitude change. A tape recorded 
interview followed which included various experimental checks, as well 
as subject assessment of their assignments and the study. 
Responses to the experimental checks SHggesLed successful 
manipulation of the four factors. In addition, these revealed a minority 
of results which had to be excluded. 
The Primary results, or those relating to the dependent variable 
and experimental Hypotheses, demonstrated confirmation of one but not 
the other. Frey and Irle's differential predictions were not upheld, 
regardless of whether or not Involvement was considered. 
The Secondary results, or those not directly relating to the 
dependent variable and Hypotheses, notably demonstrated that the reasons 
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for subjects' compliance were non-financial, which does not support 
either Frey or Irle's differential predictions, or either Dissonance 
or Incentive theories in general. 
Dissonance theory was originally built on a shaky foundation 
of vaguely defined concepts, unclear information about the interplay 
between concepts, and poorly backed assumptions presented as facts. 
Such a theory then proved very difficult either to confirm-
or disprove. This partly explains the enigma of research results that 
are diametrically opposed. In addition, the lack of theoretical conciseness 
has allowed Experimental bias to play a role in the definitions and 
boundaries of concepts, and their operations more stingent. 
Definitions of terms and operations, would have reduced these 
'intuitional' applications to research. 
However, even a non-partisan theorist would have difficulty 
testing Dissonance theory, because of its vagueness. Soon after its 
introduction, there was a tendency for polarisation of research. The 
reputations of many researchers were bound up with predictions that their 
theories demanded. This partisan attitude did not help the attitude 
change field and this is unfortunate. 
As a result of the readiness to propose alternatives, there are 
alternate theories which are as loosely formulated as Dissonance theory, 
Incentive theory falls into this category. 
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In addition, more critical evaluation of the literature 
would have revealed the often blatant flaws of past research, for 
example the studies which have provided no adequate Control groups. 
In the case of Dissonance theory, certain aspects have been 
thrashed to the exclusion of others. For example, the effects of different 
arnmmts of financial Incentive, has received considerable research ;:. · 
attention (despite the fact that a Zero incentive Control has been largely 
overlooked). In contrast, individual differences of the effects of· 
personality variables has received less attention. It is possible that 
different mechanisms, relating to attitudes change, operate in different 
personality types. 
Other questions which could be fruitfully e.xaminod include the 
relativity between such tenns as Public and Anonymous. These are treated 
by such researchers as Frey and Irle, as absolute. Yet the "Public" 
of some researchers, is akin\ to the ''.Anonymous'' of others, Nuttin 1s 
Public condition was a supposed nationwide T.V. telecast. (Nuttin 1975 
P66). Yet, other researchers will use the same tenn to describe conditions 
of a much less public nature. 
There are additional ways to improve the quality of research in 
this area, apart from the imperative of adequate Control groups. There 
needs to be more stringency in the selection of subjects, especially in 
regard to equality of financial status. It is important to weaken the 
student evaluative expectation. Subjects are likely to comply, because 
they fear the consequences of not going along with their lecturer's 
request. It would be preferable to use people not included in evaluation 
of the subject, in the role of Experimenter. Thus different levels of 
financial Incentive would be more clearly differentiated, if experimenters 
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avoided the attenuation caused by recruitment pa)'Inents. The American 
experimental credit points system, could also have a confotu1ding effect 
on this variable. 
Certainly more is needed in the way of Experimental checks. 
For example, the Secrecy requirement requires a better means of veri-
fication, than that used by many studies. If the request is for a 'limited 
period' this is more realistic and more likely to be fulfilled, than 
attempts to swear someone to complete secrecy, especially when there· 
is no means of monitoring the latter. 
However, perhaps one of the main dangers for the field, are 
any attempts to explain complex behaviour, by utilising a simplistically 
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APPENDIX A. 
PERSONAL IMPORTANCE QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire consists of JO statements 
concerning different issues. Some of the statements are 
in favour of a particular issue, while others are 
against a particular issue. You must read each issue 
statement very carefully to be sure that you understand 
it. 
You are required to do two things. 
Firstly, you must decide how important each 
particular issue is to you, regardless of whether you 
agree or disagree with the statement. To do this, 
you must look at the scale, and carefully choose one 
of the 13 numbers that best describes the degree of 
importance the particular issue holds for you personally. 
Write the number that you have chosen in the first column 
to the right of the statement which is labelled "degree 
of importance to me". We stress that we are only 
interested in how important each issue is to you 
personally, not to anyone else. 
Secondly, you must decide whether you are for or 
against the issue statement. If you are in favour of a 
particular issue statement, plac~ a tick (J) in the 
second column to the right of the statements, which is 
labelled "Agree of Disagree". If you are opposed to a 
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particular statement, you must place a cross (x) in the 
same column. For each statement you must place either 
a tick ( v') .2.£ a cross (x). 
Remember to read each issue statement very 
carefully and take your time in deciding. Do not 
hesitate to ask the meaning of an issue statement that 













13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 3 2 
Degree of 
L:npcrtancc to me 
NOT IMPORTANT 
TO ME AT ALL 
1 
Agree(✓) or 








13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 
1. Fines for speeding should be 
raised 
2. More cat owners should prepare 
their cats for shows 
J. People should grow their own 
vegetables 
4. · It is not cruel to keep 
budgies in bird-cages. 
5. Dogs should not be allowed 
in the house 
6. The Government should spend 
more money on defence 
7. To decrease pollution of the 
~i·~ op0~ ~4 ~0~ ~~culrl b~ ,._,,, .., j -•• • ..i...~ V .__,.,,.,, U V 
banned in Christchurch 
8. Vandals should repay So~iety 
by working to repaid the damag 
they have caused 
9. More litter control officers 
should be employed in 
Christchurch to deal with 
the litter problem 
10. No dogs should be allowed in 
Christchurch 
11. The Communist Party should 
not be allowed to participate 
in New Zealand general 
elections 
12. More Pacific Islanders should 
be allowed to emigrate to New 
Zealand 
lJ. The baking of Sunday bread 







TO ME A 'I' ALL 
4 3 2 
Degree of 
importance to me 
1 















TO ME AT ALL' 
13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Degree of 
importance to me 
14. It should not be compulsory to 
join a trade union 
15. Less coffee should be drunk 
because it keeps you awake at 
night 
16. More overseas doctors should be 
encouraged to come to New 
Zealand 
17. Children under the age of 10 
should not be allowed to watch 
television programmes showing 
violence 
18. The Government in New Zealand 
should nationalize more factoriec 
19. The voting age in General 
Elections-should be further 
lowered to the age of 16 
20. ~hA ~rP.n~h fnnrl frn~~ lP~q - - ~- -- -o- ----a-
should be introduced into 
New Zealand's diet. 
21. Convicted drunken drivers should 
not be allowed to drive again 
22. Euthanasia should not be allowed 
under any circumstances 
23. It is a good idea to eat fish 
on Friday 
24. The law should not be changed 
to allow abortion to be more 
freely available 
25. Marijuana smoking should be 
legalised in New Zealand 
26. Capital punishment should not be 
reintroduced into New Zealand 
27. The water level of Lake 
Manapouri should be raised to 
provide more hydroelectricity 
28. Police in New Zealand should not 
be armed with guns 
29. New Zealand should continue to 
send sports teams to South Africa 
JO. All packets of cigarettes should 
carry a warning that smoking can 
be a health risk. 
Agree ( ✓) or 




This questionnaire allows you to show just how 
strongly you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. Directly under these instructions is a set 
of seven numbers which correspond to how strongly you may 
agree or disagree with each statement. Read each 
statement very carefully and indicate the extent of your 
agreement or disagreement by writing one of these numbers 



















3 2 1 
1. Dogs should not be allowed in the house 
2. Fines for speeding should not be raised 
J. The law should not be changed to allow 
abortion to be more freely available 
4. rThe water level of Lake Manapouri should 
be raised to provide more hydroelectricity 
5. More litter control officers should be 
employed in Christchurch to deal with the 
litter problem 
6. Children under the age of 10 should not be 
allowed to watch television programmes 
showing violence. 
7. New Zealand should continue to send sports 
teams to South Africa 


















3 2 1 
9. Police in New Zealand should not be armed 
with guns 
10. Less coffee should be drunk because it keeps 
you awake at night 
11. It is a good idea to eat fish on Friday 
12. The French food frogs' legs should be 
introduced into New Zealand's diet 
13. People should grow their own vegetables 
14. The Government should spend more money on defence 
15. Euthanasia should not be allowed under any 
circumstances 
16. The Communist Party should not be allowed to 
participate in New Zealand General Elections 
17. To decrease pollution of the air, open fires 
shnulrl he hQnnPd in Ch~i~tchurch 
18. The baking of Sunday bread should be prohibited 
19. More Pacific Islanders should be allowed to 
emigrate to New Zealand 
20. Convicted drunken drivers should not be allowed 
to drive again 
21. Vandals should repay Society by working to 
repay the damage they have caused 
22. It should not be compulsory to join a trade union 
23. All packets of cigarettes should carry a warning 
that smoking can be a health risk 
24. The Government in New Zealand should nationalize 
more factories 
25. The voting age in General Elections should be 
further lowered to the age of 16 
26. Capital punishment should not be reintroduced 
into New Zealand 
27. IvTore overseas doctors should be encouraged to 
come to New Zealand 
28. More cat owners should prepare their cats for shows 
29. Marijuana smoking should be ler;alised in New 
Zealand 
JO. No dogs should be allowed in Christchurch 
